3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
French nor
the US willing to back down on their approach”. That left “the UK
in a very
difficult
position”:
“Unlike the
French, we are committed (politically) to participating in any
military
action. But
unlike the Americans, the Government needs to be sure that there
is
a secure
legal basis … given that the PM has stated on numerous occasions
that
any action
will be in accordance with international law.”
483.
Ms Adams told
Lord Goldsmith that she had “no indication of precisely
what
Number 10
would like to discuss with you”, but she addressed three
points:
•
the need
for the Council to “make clear that there has been a breach of
the
cease‑fire
conditions which is ‘sufficiently grave to undermine the basis
or
effective
operation of the cease‑fire’”;
•
“what would
be the position if the UK were to propose a second resolution
which
was then
not adopted by the Council?”; and
•
what would
happen in the event of no resolution.
484.
Addressing the
second point, Ms Adams wrote that there was:
“… nothing
to prevent us from tabling a draft second resolution authorising
the use
of force
if, as expected, the Iraqis did not comply with the Council’s
demands in the
first
resolution. But there is no guarantee that such a resolution would
be adopted.
The
question then would be whether the perverse failure of the Council
to adopt the
resolution
(perhaps because of a single veto) would justify recourse to
unilateral
action
…”
“This is a
question which would have to be considered very carefully in the
light
of the
circumstances at the time. The Law Officers advised in 1997 … that
there
could be
‘exceptional circumstances in which although the Council had not
made
a
determination of material breach it was evident to and generally
accepted by the
international
community as a whole that Iraq had in effect repudiated the
cease‑fire
and that a
resort to military force to deal with the consequences of Iraq’s
conduct
was the
only way to ensure compliance with the cease‑fire
conditions.”
“I
understand this passage was included in the advice to cover the
sort of situation
where the
Council was unable to act. But of course the counter view would be
that
if the
Council has rejected a resolution authorising the use of force,
then under the
scheme of
the Charter, it cannot be said that force is legally
justified.”
487.
Ms Adams
recommended that if Lord Goldsmith had “concerns about
the
lawfulness
of military action under any of these scenarios”, he should make
that “very
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