3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
Mr Mikhail
Wehbe, Syrian Permanent Representative to the UN, said the
UK’s
“non-paper
made matters even worse as it included warnings over and
above
those in
1441 as well as multiple ultimata”.
•
Mr Stefan
Tafrov, Bulgarian Permanent Representative to the UN, “felt this
was
a genuine
effort at consensus that would need some time to
digest”.
•
Mr Martin
Belinga Eboutou, Cameroonian Permanent Representative to the
UN,
“thought
this might open a path to bringing forward the different
viewpoints”.
•
Mr Munir
Akram, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the UN, asked “a
host
of
questions” and said “he had always envisaged a ‘credibility test’
that would
show
peaceful disarmament was possible”; but Pakistan had seen that as
the
“first
instalment and as deriving from the 1284 key tasks”.
•
Mr Ismael
Gaspar Martins, Angolan Permanent Representative to the
UN,
“saw value
in the paper and liked the idea of disarmament in
instalments”.
•
Mr Juan
Gabriel Valdés, Chilean Permanent Representative to the
UN,
“welcomed
this effort addressing the concerns many had recently
expressed”.
He would
divulge his country’s views the following day.
•
Mr Arias
said the approach “was a positive way of achieving
consensus”.
He “supported
the concept and content”.
376.
Dr Blix
said UNMOVIC would be sending its draft of the key tasks required
by
resolution
1284 to the College of Commissioners that evening for comment by 14
March.
The tasks
would be ready the following week. It was for the Council to decide
whether
it agreed
with the tasks selected.
377.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix had:
“… said
there had been recent discussion of how to continue exerting
pressure, of
which
military pressure was the most important element. There was the
concept of
a “strategic
decision” by Iraq …
“He
understood the UK was asking for a commitment from Iraq along with
a down-
payment.
While they might not be formulated identically, all the questions
raised
by the UK
figured in the key remaining disarmament tasks … The statement
by
Saddam
Hussein was none of UNMOVIC’s business while interviews outside
Iraq
was an
element of the work programme. Progress on missiles could be
speeded up.
“How far
Iraq would be able to do the rest, he did not know. UNMOVIC’s
judgement
was that
these tasks were doable. This was not possible in two days. As for
10 days,
he did not
think he could guarantee Iraq would do it but UNMOVIC would report
on
what had
been done in the time set by the Council but not offering a
judgement.
“As we
reached the end of the period, there might be another batch
of
tests so to
continue and renew the pressure on Iraq to deliver the
fastest
disarmament possible.”
465