The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• said the IAEA strategy was to force Saddam Hussein into co-operation, though

he doubted it was possible;

• came back again and again to the theme that American public diplomacy wasn’t

working; and

• said we needed intrusive inspections but it could not be done without active

co‑operation.

147. At the FCO Iraq morning meeting on 7 February, it was reported that Dr Blix and

Dr ElBaradei had both expressed concern that plans for a second resolution should

factor in the need to allow the weapons inspectors time to get out of Iraq.36

148. In a statement on 6 February, President Bush said that Saddam Hussein was

throwing away his final opportunity to disarm voluntarily.

149. President Bush reiterated that he would “welcome” a second resolution,

as he stated in the press conference with Mr Blair on 31 January, “which made

clear the Security Council stands behind its previous demands”.

150. The “game” was “over” and the US was resolved to take whatever action

was necessary to defend itself and to disarm the Iraqi regime.

151. On 5 February, Sir David Manning and Dr Rice discussed President Bush’s

statement and the possibility that he might “lean forward” on a second resolution.37

President Bush would not seek a second resolution for its own sake, but he was open

to one if others wanted it.

152. In a statement on 6 February, President Bush emphasised the challenges of

uncovering secret information in a totalitarian society.38 He stated that Iraqi violations

of Security Council resolutions were “evident, and they continue to this hour”.

The Iraqi regime had “never accounted for a vast arsenal of deadly biological and

chemical weapons” and it was “pursuing an elaborate campaign to conceal its weapons

materiels, and to hide or intimidate key experts and scientists”, directed “from the very

highest levels”.

153. President Bush set out examples of Iraq’s violations, including:

• “Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile

factories for the production of biological agents” that “could produce within just

months hundreds of pounds of biological poisons”.

36 Minute Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting: Key Points’.

37 Letter Manning to McDonald, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

38 The White House, 6 February 2003, President Bush: “World Can Rise to this Moment” – Statement by

the President.

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