11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
168.
On 7 October,
the JIC assessed that:
“A number
of former senior Ba’athists formed the New Regional Command (NRC)
in
the early
summer, based in Damascus with members in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan
and
the Gulf
states. The NRC maintains links to a number of insurgent groups and
may
provide
some strategic military and political direction and funding. But
the scope
and scale
of its influence is not clear and, whatever its aspirations, the
NRC has not
yet
developed a coherent or widespread Sunni following. Many, if not
most, Sunni
Arab
insurgents are happy to oppose the coalition but are not part of
any efforts to
reinvigorate
the Ba’ath party.”142
169.
On 11 October,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary that:
“We plan to
work on Iraq’s neighbours to support Allawi’s efforts to detach
former
Ba’athists
from the insurgency and persuade them to run for elections. Allawi
told
us in
London that he was hoping to arrange a conference of former
Ba’athists in
170.
At the end of
October, the JIC assessed that:
“Intelligence
indicates a number of former Ba’athist groups are operating, but
not
necessarily
in a co‑ordinated fashion.”144
171.
On 11
November, the JIC reported that although there was no overall
co‑ordination
of the
insurgency:
“Some
intelligence suggests that the Syria‑based Ba’athist new Regional
Command
is becoming
more influential.”145
172.
On 4 December,
the British Embassy Baghdad sent the FCO an account of
a meeting
between Mr Gavin Hood, the Embassy’s Legal Adviser, and
Dr Fadel
Jamal
Kadhum, Legal Adviser to Prime Minister Allawi.146
They had
discussed a new
de‑Ba’athification
Order.
173.
The report of
the meeting said that the effect of CPA Orders No.1, 2 and 5
had
been to
remove an estimated 35,000 people from their posts, of whom 15,000
had so far
been
allowed to return. A further 700 had been offered retirement and
8,000 applications
for
“rehabilitation” remained outstanding. Dr Chalabi’s Commission
had removed a
further
3,000 individuals from office.
142
JIC
Assessment, 7 October 2004, ‘Iraq Security: External Support for
Insurgents”.
143
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 11 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning’.
144
JIC
Assessment, 27 October 2004, ‘Iraq: A Long Term Insurgency
Problem’.
145
JIC
Assessment, 11 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security – Current
Concerns’.
146
eGram 452
Baghdad to FCO London, 4 December 2004, ‘Iraq:
‘Re‑Ba’athification’.
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