10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
•
consider
the lessons that DFID had identified since the I-CAP was
produced,
and how it
would respond to them;
•
consider
how the reconstruction effort could and should contribute to
broader
UK objectives;
and
•
consider
whether the level of resources available to achieve DFID’s
objectives
in Iraq
was right, and whether DFID was working in the most effective
way.
336.
In the absence
of that analysis, the I-CAP review could not (and did not) test
the
position
that DFID had reached.
337.
Mr Anderson
visited Iraq from 13 to 18 June.191
338.
In his report
to Mr Dinham, copies of which were sent to officials in DFID,
the
FCO and the
MOD, Mr Anderson identified a number of “strategic issues”,
including
the
expected decline in the amount of aid going to Iraq. US funding
would decline from
US$18.4bn
over two years (the current IRFF2 package) to around US$1bn in
2006/07.
Japanese
grants were “now exhausted” and DFID’s programme would decline
in
2006/07.
There might be “modest increases” in UN and World Bank programmes
but
“even in
the most optimistic scenario, there will be a dramatic decline in
aid levels due
to the
changing US position”.
339.
That rapid
decline raised three strategic issues:
•
What impact
would declining aid have on security?
•
Was this
the right time for donors to be reducing aid? Research showed
that
aid during
or immediately following conflict tended to be wasted. It was
most
effective
between four and seven years after a conflict.
•
Was DFID
right to treat Iraq as a MIC? The planned decline in
DFID’s
programme
was based on the “premise” that Iraq had adequate resources
to
fund its
own development. But did that hold true when security was poor
and
oil revenues
difficult to obtain?
340.
DFID has not
been able to provide the Inquiry with any response from
Mr Dinham,
or any
record of a discussion of aid volumes.192
341.
Dr John Reid,
the Defence Secretary, circulated a paper on the options for
future
UK force
posture in Iraq to DOP(I) on 16 June (see Section
9.4).193
342.
The paper
stated that there was a “clear UK military aspiration” to transfer
security
responsibilities
to Iraqi forces in Muthanna and Maysan in October 2005, with
the
remaining
MND(SE) provinces (Basra and Dhi Qar) following in April 2006. That
was
191
Minute
Anderson to Dinham, 19 June 2005, ‘Back to Office Report: Iraq 13 –
18 June’.
192
Email DFID
[junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 19 June 2013,
‘Iraq Inquiry New Queries’.
193
Paper Reid,
14 June 2005, ‘Options for Future UK Force Posture in
Iraq’.
253