12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
A report to
Congress in July 2005 stated that, under CPA Order No.91, nine
militias
were to be
integrated into the ISF.701
Of those
nine, only the Kurdistan Democratic Party,
the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Peshmergas and the Badr Organisation
remained as
“significant
entities”. The other six organisations had either disbanded or been
“assigned
to personal
security details”. JAM was not part of the integration process as
it was viewed
as a
potential insurgent organisation rather than a militia. The report
assessed:
“The ITG
and its predecessor have had some success in integrating militias
into the
ISF, but
militia elements integrated into the ISF typically remain within
pre‑existing
organisational
structures and retain their original loyalties or
affiliations.”
The nature
of the insurgency was discussed at the DOP(I) on 26
May.702
Mr William
Ehrman,
Chairman of the JIC, said that it was looking likely that elements
of JAM would
be absorbed
into the ISF. In discussion, concerns were raised about the
Minister and the
Ministry of
Interior, with rumours that the MOI was sanctioning sectarian
attacks.
A JIC
Assessment on 12 October stated:
“The issue
of militias and their incorporation into the ISF has still not been
resolved …
In the
absence of an effective local ISF, the MOD with MNF support has
begun to
recruit a
Sunni tribal militia in Anbar province to help deal with AQ. In
both Shia
and Sunni
areas of Baghdad there have been calls for local militias to be
raised to
improve
security. We judge the perpetuation of militia forces, on ethnic,
tribal, or
political
lines, carries significant risks for the future.”703
753.
Dr Reid’s
letter to the Prime Minister on 28 August 2005 made clear
that
the
original timescale for the completion of the Petraeus Plan
(mid‑2006) was not
achievable.704
The number
of trained and equipped IMOD forces was “just below
80,000” and
would “reach full authorised strength (currently 106,000) in
November
2006”. MOI
force numbers were “just over 95,000” and “should reach full
strength
(193,500)
in 2007”.
754.
A JIC
Assessment about the ISF on 12 October reported that the forces
had
“again
expanded rapidly”: the Iraqi Armed Forces stood at 91,000 personnel
and MOI
forces
106,000 personnel.705
The JIC
cautioned that those figures did not take account
of
absenteeism or “provide an indication of true capability”. MNF
planners foresaw a
continued
need for substantial MNF forces, capable of conducting combat
operations,
701
Report to
Congress, July 2005, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
702
Minutes, 26
May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
703
JIC
Assessment, 12 October 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Very Slow
Progress’.
704
Minute Reid
to Blair, 28 August 2005, ‘Update on Progress of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF)’.
705
JIC
Assessment, 12 October 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Very Slow
Progress’.
225