3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
“to give up
all weapons of mass destruction activity” was to let the inspectors
back in
and allow
them to do their work.
211.
Asked if the
term “he’ll find out” was threatening, Secretary Powell stated that
it
should be
seen “as a very sober, chilling message”. There were “many options
available
to the
international community and to the President”.
212.
Secretary
Powell stated that the US had been pushing “smart sanctions”. It
had
support
from 14 of the 15 members of the Security Council, and he had been
“working
with the
Russians to see if we can find a compromise that would satisfy the
need”.
213.
Secretary
Powell added that sanctions had kept the Iraqi regime “fairly well
bottled
up”. Iraq
was a “danger” and continued “to try to develop” weapons of mass
destruction.
The US
would:
“… keep the
pressure on them to make sure these weapons do not become
a
serious
threat to the region or to the world.”
214.
In the context
of President Bush’s remarks on 26 November, the British
Embassy
Washington
reported that US officials in Washington and New York were
discussing
the draft
resolution with Russian officials.110
215.
Mr Ben
Bradshaw, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign
and
Commonwealth
Affairs, told the House of Commons on 27 November that he did
not
think it
was “helpful to speculate about the expansion of the current
military campaign
[in Afghanistan]”:
“People
should not speculate about expanding the … campaign beyond Bin
Laden
and
al-Qaeda … There is no evidence of any other state involvement … We
have
always made
it clear that the military campaign is limited and
specific.”111
216.
Asked
specifically about Iraq and President Bush’s remarks, Mr Bradshaw
replied
that Iraq
“could very easily solve the problem by adhering to the demands”
made by
the UN. He
reiterated that the military campaign was directed specifically at
those
responsible
for “the mass murder of 11 September”.112
217.
In an
interview in October, Mr Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister,
stated that
Iraq would
not allow weapons inspectors to return asking: “Why should they
return?”.113
218.
Responding to
a question on whether in the light of Iraq’s rejection of the call
to
admit
weapons inspectors there was a need to increase the pressure on
Iraq and the
next steps,
Mr Fleischer stated on 27 November that the focus remained on the
first
110
Telegram
1589 Washington to FCO London, 26 November 2001, ‘Iraq: US Policy
on Regime Change’.
111 House
of Commons, Official
Report, 27
November 2001, column 820.
112
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 27
November 2001, columns 820-821.
113
The
Telegraph, 28
October 2001, Attack on
Iraq ‘will be grave mistake’, warns Aziz.
349