The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

65. On what would happen in the event of a veto, the author of the document wrote that

it was:

“… probably too difficult [to say] at this stage – everything depends on the circs …

But knowing the answer to the legal implications of 1441 … would either (i) leave us

no worse off than we are – if the AG [Attorney General] thinks the argument doesn’t

run or (ii) radically improve the situation if the AG thinks we have a case.”

66. Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, commented to

Sir David Manning that the document was:

“… helpful. Of course a S[ecurity] C[ouncil] discussion is needed if there is a material

breach. But as the PM has said all along that discussion must be in the context of

an understanding that action must follow.”14

67. On 15 November, Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, sent

Sir David Manning an update on military discussions with the US setting out the themes

which had emerged.15 Mr Watkins registered a number of concerns including:

“Lack of clarity in US thinking about possible triggers for military action needs to be

resolved quickly …”

68. Mr Watkins added:

“To some extent, triggers are now under Saddam’s control and so cannot be slotted

into any firm timetable. Moreover, what constitutes a ‘violation’ and/or ‘material

breach’ remains undefined: many in the US are reduced to saying ‘we’ll know when

we see it’, which is not a suitable base for planning.”

69. Mr Hoon believed that the UK response should include working “quickly to reach

an agreed US/UK view on triggers … well before we are confronted with it in practice”.

70. A copy of the letter was sent to Mr Straw’s Private Office.

71. Mr Straw held a Private Office meeting on 20 November to discuss Iraq

policy with Sir Michael Jay, the FCO Permanent Under Secretary (PUS),

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Sir David Manning and Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO

Political Director.16

72. Sir Jeremy told Mr Straw that he “believed we could get a second resolution

provided the Americans did not go for material breach too early”. The “facts to convince

nine members of the Security Council” would be needed. He thought that the Council

“would not … need much persuading”.

14 Manuscript comment Rycroft to Manning, 20 November 2002, on Paper [unattributed and undated],

‘Background on Material Breach’.

15 Letter Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning after UNSCR 1441’.

16 Minute McDonald to Gray, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Follow-up to SCR 1441’.

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