The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
77.
Sir William
Patey, Head of the FCO’s Middle East Department from 1999 to
March
2002, told
the Inquiry that he was aware of “drumbeats” from voices in
Washington who
were
talking about the possibility of regime change and arming Iraqi
opposition groups,
but that
the UK’s policy was “to stay away from that end of the
spectrum”.46
78.
Mr Webb told
the Inquiry that “regime overthrow was … mentioned [by
US
interlocutors]
but it was quite clear that there was no proposition being put in
our
direction …
about regime change”.47
79.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New
York
from 1998
to July 2003, wrote in his statement to the Inquiry:
“For all
the rumbling in the background, Iraq did not appear to be at the
top end of
the new
Administration’s list of priorities in those early Bush
months.”48
80.
Mr Jonathan
Powell and Mr Sawers visited Washington on 14 January, where
they
met several
members of President Bush’s team, including Dr
Rice.49
81.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that Dr Rice had been “critical of the
Clinton
Administration’s
policy of talking tough but actually acting rather weakly and
she
included
Iraq in that criticism”.50
His
impression was of a US Administration which would
“take a
hard edged approach but would nonetheless want to work with the
United
Kingdom”,
and whose main concerns would be domestic:
“The issues
about tax cuts and prescription drugs and social security reform
were
very much
uppermost in the minds at the top of the [US] Administration rather
than
any
specific foreign policy issue, apart from missile
defence.”
82.
President Bush
was inaugurated on 20 January.
83.
In late
January, the FCO’s Middle East Department produced a paper
which
reassessed
the UK’s “fundamental interests” in relation to Iraq and
recommended a new
approach to
promoting them.51
The UK’s
interests included:
•
regional
stability, including through the non-proliferation of
WMD;
•
preserving
the credibility and authority of the Security Council;
•
maintaining
the coherence of UK policy, including on human rights, adherence
to
resolutions
and non-proliferation;
•
improving
the humanitarian and human rights situation in Iraq;
•
avoiding a
US/UK split; and
•
reducing
the UK’s isolation in the EU.
46
Public
hearing, 24 November 2009, pages 26-27.
47
Public
hearing, 24 November 2009, page 28.
48
Statement,
27 November 2009, page 4.
49
Meyer
C. DC
Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain’s Ambassador to
the US at the Time of
9/11 and the
Run-up to the Iraq War. Phoenix,
2006.
50
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 5-6.
51
Paper FCO,
January 2001, ‘Iraq: A Fresh Look at UK Interests’.
206