The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

assessment is that it is more a question of when there is a fatality amongst our

diplomatic staff, rather than if. This assumption needs to be shared or challenged

by the risk owners.” 290

425. The main findings included:

• Significant deterioration in the security of UK posts: in Basra, because of

insufficient military protection; in Baghdad, because of the increasing threat

from extremists.

• An increasing threat of kidnap. FCO security officials were looking at providing

key staff with transponders to detect their location in case they were captured.

• The SOSA’s judgement that senior staff were facing “undue political pressure to

‘produce the goods’ which could lead to the acceptance of inappropriate levels

of risk”. Security managers and heads of close protection teams were “acting

as a constraint on senior staff movements to risky areas”.

• Signs of speculation in other government departments about moving “off‑shore”

because of the “nearly impossible operating environment”.

426. On 12 June, Sir Michael Jay updated Mrs Margaret Beckett, who had succeeded

Mr Straw as Foreign Secretary in early May 2006:

“We have always been aware of the risks of operating in Iraq. Because of the

political importance to the UK of our work in Iraq, we have judged it acceptable to

tolerate a higher level of risk there (and in southern Afghanistan) than elsewhere

in the world. But our duty of care towards our staff, and towards those from other

government departments who work in our posts, remains.

“We invest considerable resources in reducing as far as is possible the risk to our

staff, and all those for whom we are responsible. We have in place robust structures

to manage and mitigate risk, which are subject to constant review, in response to

changes in the situation on the ground. We recognise, however, that there remains

a residual level of risk in operating in such an extreme environment, against which

we cannot wholly protect ourselves.” 291

427. Sir Michael listed the four conditions for any FCO member of staff working in Iraq:

“• All staff must be volunteers;

• They must be fully aware of the security risks;

• We must do all we reasonably can to reduce the risks they face;

• Conditions on the ground must be such that staff are able to do their jobs

effectively.”

290 Minute Noble to Casey, 6 June 2006, ‘Security of our Posts in Baghdad and Basra’.

291 Minute Jay to Foreign Secretary, 12 June 2006, ‘Iraq: Security of Our Posts in Baghdad and Basra’.

318