4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
sub-source
who reported only once and whom the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) was
not able to
contact after the conflict.
52.
The need
for a revised set of controls for Iraq’s WMD and military
programmes
was agreed
by No.10 in March 2001.
53.
An FCO
initiative seeking more information publicly to explain policy on
Iraq
seems not
to have been pursued.
54.
Sir John
Sawers, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs from
1999 to 2001,
told the
Inquiry that, during the first meeting of Mr Blair and
President Bush at Camp David
on 23
February 2001 (see Section 1.2), Mr Colin Powell, US Secretary
of State, had:
“… made
clear that he was most concerned about Iraqi activities on chemical
and
biological
weapons. There was a range of dual use goods here that should
be
properly
controlled and should be subject to sanctions but the wider range
of trade
sanctions
should be removed.”23
55.
The record of
the Camp David meeting stated that the US and UK agreed on
the
need for a
policy which was more widely supported in the Middle East
region.24
As
a
result of
the policy of the previous 10 years, Iraq was not as large a threat
as it could
have been
(including to Kuwait); but Saddam was still pursuing WMD (he had
done little
on the
nuclear side).
56.
The revised
policy framework for Iraq, issued by No.10 on 7 March 2001,
began:
“A revised
set of controls [on Iraq] would be introduced as soon as possible,
focused
on Iraq’s
WMD and military programmes.”25
57.
Mr Tim
Dowse, Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO)
Non‑Proliferation
Department from January 2001 to November 2003, told the
Inquiry
that the
FCO Board expressed an interest in early 2001 in drawing on
intelligence and
unclassified
material to put more into the public domain to explain policy on
Iraq.26
58.
The UK
Government has been unable to identify any documents relating
to
23
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 15-16.
24
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 24 February 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Talks
with President Bush,
Camp David,
23 February 2001’.
25
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 7 March 2001, ‘Iraq: New Policy
Framework’.
26
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, page 67.
27
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 16 September 2015,
‘Iraq Inquiry Request for
Documents’.
23