The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
decision to deploy a large scale force for potential combat
operations
was taken
without collective Ministerial consideration of the decision
and
its implications.
•
The large
scale force deployed was a one‑shot capability. It would have
been
difficult
to sustain the force if combat operations had been delayed until
autumn
2003 or
longer, and it constrained the capabilities which were available
for a UK
military
contribution to post‑conflict operations.
813.
The following
key findings are from Section 6.3:
•
The
decisions taken between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January
2003
to increase
combat forces and bring forward the date on which UK
forces
might
participate in combat operations compressed the timescales
available
for preparation.
•
The
achievements made in preparing the forces in the time available
were very
considerable,
but the deployment of forces more quickly than anticipated in
the
Defence
Planning Assumptions meant that there were some serious
equipment
shortfalls
when conflict began.
•
Those
shortfalls were exacerbated by the lack of an effective asset
tracking
system, a
lesson from previous operations and exercises that the MOD
had
identified
but not adequately addressed.
•
Ministers
were not fully aware of the risks inherent in the decisions and the
MOD
and PJHQ
were not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the
conflict.
814.
The following
key findings are from Section 6.4, and relate to evidence
in
Sections 6.4
and 6.5:
•
Before the
invasion of Iraq, Ministers, senior officials and the UK
military
recognised
that post‑conflict civilian and military operations were likely
to
be the strategically
decisive phase of the Coalition’s engagement in Iraq.
•
UK planning
and preparation for the post‑conflict phase of operations,
which
rested on
the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its
military
presence in
Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were
wholly
inadequate.
•
The
information available to the Government before the invasion
provided a
clear
indication of the potential scale of the post‑conflict task and the
significant
risks
associated with the UK’s proposed approach.
•
Foreseeable
risks included post‑conflict political disintegration and
extremist
violence in
Iraq, the inadequacy of US plans, the UK’s inability to
exert
significant
influence on US planning and, in the absence of UN
authorisation
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