10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
369.
Ministers
agreed that DFID should discuss with the MOD, the Permanent
Joint
Headquarters
(PJHQ), 1 (UK) Div, ORHA and the IPU “measures to achieve a
step
change in
rehabilitation in the South”, before discussing funding with the
Treasury
and presenting
a plan to the AHMGIR on 22 May.
370.
On 16 May,
Ambassador Bremer issued CPA Regulation No.1.207
It
stated:
“The CPA
shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide
for
the
effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional
administration,
to restore
conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which
the Iraqi
people can
freely determine their own political future, including by advancing
efforts
to restore
and establish national and local institutions for representative
governance
and
facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and
development.”
371.
The DFID team
in Basra sent DFID a stock-take of the situation in the South
on
19
May.208
ORHA(South)
was suffering from the lack of policy guidance, support
and
specialist
staffing from ORHA(Baghdad). Danish staff in ORHA(South) had
received
US$500,000
from the Danish Government; that appeared to be all of
ORHA(South)’s
“immediately
accessible” funding. ORHA(South) barely had enough staff to cover
the
most urgent
tasks, such as the payment of salaries; more support was required.
There
was a risk
that neglect by ORHA(South) in these initial months would allow
“alternative
structures”
to emerge.
372.
The DFID team
also reported that “many military units” had said that they did
not
have the
capacity to implement QIPs to the extent that they would like. 1
(UK) Div was
aware of
the “disconnect” between their capacity and the need to implement
£29m worth
of QIPs.
The DFID team recommended that military capacity should be
augmented.
373.
Sir David
Manning visited Baghdad and Basra for the first time from 20 to 21
May.
In his
report to Mr Blair, he echoed Mr Sawers’ assessment that
Baghdad was key,
observing
that Basra was “way ahead” of Baghdad. Joining the growing chorus
of critics
of ORHA,
Sir David described it as a “shambles”.209
374.
Sir David
described Ambassador Bremer as “impressive”. One way of helping
him
would be to
get DFID:
“… properly
and energetically engaged. (There is a residue of bitterness
about
their lack
of involvement: they have committed few people and have apparently
just
completed
their third independent reconnaissance about security for staff
before
deploying
more people). Valerie [Amos] will make things change. I hope she
will get
experts to
ORHA very fast.”
207
Coalition
Provisional Authority, Regulation Number 1, 16 May 2003,
The
Coalition Provisional Authority.
208
Minute DFID
[junior officials] to DFID [junior official], 19 May 2003, ‘DFID
Basrah: Issues Paper’.
209
Letter
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Visit to Baghdad and
Basra’.
67