The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
899.
On 13 June,
the al‑Askari mosque in Samarra, which had previously been
bombed
in February
2006 (see Section 9.4), was bombed for a second
time.492
Grand
Ayatollah
al‑Sistani
publicly condemned the bombing, but appealed to the Iraqi Shia
community to
show
restraint.
900.
On 13 June, a
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2)
wrote
to
Mr McDonald seeking “policy guidance” on JAM and Shia outreach
contacts.493
The minute
was copied to Lt Gen Lamb, VAdm Style, Mr Howard, Maj Gen
Dutton,
Maj Gen Shaw,
Mr Dowse, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary, Mr Asquith
and Mr Jones.
The document
was not copied more widely in the Cabinet Office.
901.
In the letter,
the senior official explained that, with Maj Gen Shaw’s agreement
and
with the
knowledge of Mr Asquith and Lt Gen Lamb, there had been
“exploratory talks”
for “some
weeks” with JAM1 from his detention in Basra (see Section 9.4). He
explained
that JAM1
remained an influential figure in JAM in Basra and beyond and had
continued
to
communicate with JAM whilst in detention.
902.
During a
series of interviews, JAM1 had expressed concern about growing
Iranian
influence
over JAM. The senior official told Mr McDonald: “We assess
that he is telling
the truth
in this respect”.
903.
The senior
official explained that JAM1 had said that he was ready to work
to
reduce JAM
attacks on MNF, focusing initially on indirect fire. JAM1
maintained that,
under his
influence, the JAM mainstream in Basra would gradually be able to
reassert
authority
over the secret cells. In return for reducing indirect fire from
JAM, he wanted a
suspension
of strike operations and the release of detainees. To build
confidence, it was
proposed
that this process would need to begin with a short trial period
cease‑fire.
904.
The senior
official reported that JAM1 accepted MNF’s right to self‑defence
and
to continue
to intercept smuggled arms supplies during this period but rejected
the
MNF’s right
to target JAM secret cells, arguing that it was for JAM to control
its own
people.
There was no intention to concede this point. The trial cease‑fire
was proposed
for
15 to 17 June. If this was effective “the next step could be a
longer cease-fire, for
which
[JAM1] would expect more detainee releases and a continued
suspension of
strike operations”.
905.
The senior
official also reported that Maj Gen Shaw was content to test
JAM1’s
ability to
influence JAM, on the basis that a short suspension of strike
operations and
the release
of some detainees fitted fortuitously with existing plans. Two of
the detainees
whose
release had been requested by JAM1 were likely to be released
before 15 June,
which would
be presented to JAM1 as being as a direct response to his
cease‑fire offer
and a sign
of coalition good faith.
492
New York
Times, 13 June
2007, Shiite
Leaders Appeal for Calm After New Shrine Attack.
493
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to
McDonald, 13 June 2007, ‘Shia
engagement:
[JAM1]’.
168