The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1107.
The first
record seen by the Inquiry of a discussion of post-conflict issues
between
Mr Hoon and
Secretary Rumsfeld was in Washington on 12 February (see Section
6.5).
1108.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry that his expression of concern to the Prime
Minister
at the
briefing “was more about the immediate aftermath, immediately after
the fighting
phase, what
would we need to do to provide security in the first instance, but
also to
provide
what we saw as being the most immediate problem would be a
humanitarian
1109.
Lt Gen Reith
attended the CENTCOM commanders’ conference in Tampa,
Florida
on 15 and
16 January. The conference was described by Gen Franks as “likely
to be the
last chance
for such a gathering to take place. It therefore had to be
conclusive.”536
1110.
Maj Gen Wilson
reported that “Phase IV responsibilities became a little clearer”
at
the
commanders’ conference: Gen Franks had demanded that JTF-4 deploy
as soon as
possible to
Kuwait and had welcomed Lt Gen Reith’s offer to embed four UK
personnel
in it. Gen
Franks had also directed that “key Phase IV players should visit
the Pentagon
to ensure
that planning was joined up”.537
1111.
In his record
of the meeting with Gen Franks, Lt Gen Reith explained that UK
staff
embedded in
JTF-4 would have “reach-back” to the Phase IV planning team in
PJHQ,
giving the
UK “considerable influence over US planning”.538
He reported
that Gen Franks
had “agreed
that we could plan on [the] UK having responsibility for the Basra
region in
Phase IV
and would welcome our setting the standard for other nations.
Clearly this will
need
Ministerial approval in due course.” Lt Gen Reith also reported
that the US had
“a zillion
dollar project to modernise and properly exploit the southern
oilfields”.
1112.
Gen Reith told
the Inquiry that, on 16 January, he told Gen Franks he
was
unhappy
with the way planning was going:
“… they
were going into shock and awe, and we … the British … had been
very
much the
custodians of ‘Let’s worry about Phase IV’. So we got on to Phase
IV in
our
discussion and I made the point … that the oilfields were
absolutely essential for
Phase IV,
to provide revenue for Iraq for its reconstruction and therefore,
we needed
to secure
the oilfields rather than have them destroyed. I also made the
point to him
that the
more china that we broke, the more we would have to replace
afterwards.”539
535
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 83.
536
Minute
Wilson to MA/CJO, 17 January 2003, ‘CENTCOM Component Commanders’
Conference:
15-16 Jan
03’.
537
Minute
Wilson to MA/CJO, 17 January 2003, ‘CENTCOM Component Commanders’
Conference:
15-16 Jan
03’.
538
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 17 January 2003, ‘Discussion with General Franks
– 16 Jan 03’.
539
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 42-43.
300