The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
870.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 15 December meeting of the AHMGIR
reported
that
signals from the CPA on the desired pace and scope of economic
reform before
transition
were “mixed”.499
Some in the
CPA had seen the accelerated political timetable
as a reason
to accelerate the pace of economic reform. The UK believed that
reform
over the
next six months should be limited, but that did not mean inaction.
The Coalition
should
focus on:
•
building
Iraqi capacity including in the budgeting system;
•
encouraging
the IFIs to engage; and
•
preparatory
work on “removing barriers and stimulating growth”, including
debt
relief,
fuel price liberalisation and SOE reform.
871.
Ministers
agreed that approach.500
872.
Hard
Lessons recorded that
the CPA’s progress towards free-market reforms
stalled in
the face of “disagreement within the Coalition’s ranks”, concern in
the IMF and
opposition
from Iraqis.501
873.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Sir Nicholas Macpherson highlighted the
role that
Treasury
secondees to the CPA had played in successfully challenging “some
proposed
[CPA]
policies that were not thought to be the right course of action –
notably negotiating
a wind-down
on the policy of mass privatisation of Iraqi state
assets”.502
874.
Ambassador
Bremer hosted a Campaign Review meeting in Baghdad on
18 December
attended by senior US and UK civilian and military
representatives
including
Sir Jeremy Greenstock.
875.
Ambassador
Bremer opened the meeting by stating that the capture of
Saddam
Hussein
provided a huge opportunity.503
He outlined
the military, political and
reconstruction
action that was needed to exploit it. On reconstruction, the CPA
would
spend
US$400m over the next six months – three times the amount for the
previous
six‑month
period. Some 40 to 50 percent of that would be directed to Sunni
areas.
499 Annotated
Agenda, 18 December 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
500
Minutes, 18
December 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
501
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
502
Statement,
15 January 2010, page 6.
503
Minute
MA1/DCDS(C) to D/DCDS(C), 19 December 2003, ‘Record of Iraq
Strategy Review Meeting –
Baghdad 18
Dec 03’.
150