The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

821. Mr Feith wrote that it now became possible to create a central post-war planning

office:

“The President knew that creating a new office … would be seen around the world

as … a sign that war was likely and imminent. Now, however, the President was

beyond that worry.”

822. In late December, Secretary Rumsfeld asked Mr Feith to start drafting the charter

for the new “central post-war planning office”.396

823. Secretary Powell, quoted in Hard Lessons, explained:

“[The] State [Department] does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to

deal with an immediate post-war situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand

miles away from here, so there was never a disagreement about this. It made

sense.”397

824. President Bush formalised the creation of the new office in January 2003

(see Section 6.5).

825. On 6 November, Mr Chaplin led an FCO/MOD/DFID/Cabinet Office delegation

equipped with the Cabinet Office steering brief of 1 November to the first round of talks

with a US inter-agency team and an Australian delegation in Washington.398

826. US participants included the NSC, the Office of the Vice President, the State

Department, DoD and the military Joint Staff. USAID was not present at the inter-agency

meeting, but did have separate discussions with DFID during the visit.

827. The British Embassy reported the outcome the following day:

“Administration planning envisages a US-led international Coalition governing

Iraq in the medium term, with a gradual transfer of power to a representative Iraqi

government. Coalition control of WMD, and the preservation of internal and external

security, are paramount objectives.

“The US favour a role for UN agencies in the transitional phase, but not overall UN

civil administration … We agree on the need to co-ordinate on humanitarian issues.”

828. Mr Drummond, a member of the UK delegation, reported to Sir David Manning on

8 November that there were significant differences between the US and UK positions

on some issues.399 Where the UK assumed the Iraqi Government would need “radical

396 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

397 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

398 Telegram 1456 Washington to FCO London, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq: UK/US Consultations on Day

After Issues: 6 November 2002’.

399 Minute Drummond to Manning, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Day After’.

252