3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
939.
Sir John
repeated his advice of 24 February that Mr Blair (and
President Bush)
should, “if
and when it becomes clear that we have the votes, and that the
Russians
and Chinese
will not veto”, attempt to dissuade President Chirac.
940.
A subsequent
telegram set out the key elements of the French position and
the
suggestions
for arguments the UK might use.290
They
included:
•
France had
repeatedly said that war was the worst of all possible
solutions,
but “war
had been made more likely by Saddam’s ability to exploit
differences
in the
international community”. The chances of Saddam Hussein taking
the
opportunity
to avoid war looked “slim”. A veto would not help and “the
only
conceivable
way of achieving a peaceful solution now is to increase the
pressure
on Saddam
by re-establishing the maximum degree of consensus in the
UN”.
•
France had
argued that war was a disproportionate response to the threat
posed
by Saddam
Hussein’s WMD, but the point had been reached where failure
to
act firmly
caused “disproportionate damage to the credibility of the will of
the
international
community and to wider efforts to limit the proliferation of
WMD”.
•
If war
became inevitable, it would be easier to “limit the destabilising
effect
elsewhere
in the region, about which France has rightly been
concerned,
if military
intervention is seen to be taken with the authority of
the
international community”.
•
Weakening
UN credibility would make it more difficult “to re-establish the
clear
and
authoritative UN-backed administration and the rapid transition to
a civil
regime in
Iraq … and more difficult for Europe to play the role the region
and
the world
will need at that point”.
941.
Separately,
Dr Michael Williams, Mr Straw’s Special Adviser, sent
Mr Straw
an analysis
of the use of the veto by France.291
He did not
think France would veto
on its own;
but if it believed Moscow would veto, the second resolution would
be lost.
It was “perhaps
most likely, if the yes votes creep up to nine and
beyond”, that
France would
“back down and say it accepts a majority verdict”. But the
UK could
not rely
on that. Dr Williams advised that a strategy was needed
which reminded
France “of
the dangers and consequences of its present course of action”;
and that
would need
Mr Blair’s engagement.
942.
The analysis
was sent to Sir David Manning and was seen by
Mr Blair.
943.
Sir Roderic
Lyne, British Ambassador to Russia, had reported on 27
February
that
Russia’s position was hardening and it largely agreed with
President Chirac.
President
Putin would find it hard to vote in favour of military action
without
a “smoking
gun” or near-consensus in the Security Council.
290
Telegram
111 Paris to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Avoiding a French
Veto – Arguments
to Use with
the French’.
291
Minute
Williams to Secretary of State [FCO], 4 March 2003, ‘France and the
Security Council’.
351