4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
25.
On 19 April
2000, the JIC produced a substantial Assessment of Iraq’s chemical
and
biological
weapons programmes.9
26.
In its Key
Judgements, the JIC stated:
“•
Our picture
is limited. But it is likely that Iraq is
continuing to develop its
offensive
chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW)
capabilities.
•
There
is clear
evidence of continuing Iraq biological warfare
activity,
including
BW related research
and
the production
of BW agent. Iraq
seems
to be
exploring the use of
mobile facilities to give its BW activities greater
security. But we
have no evidence
for Iraq filling weapons with biological
agent since
the Gulf War.
•
There
is less
evidence of continuing Iraqi chemical warfare
activity,
including
advances in binary weapons development and the
reconstruction
of suspect civil chemical production facilities. There
is no
evidence of
Iraq filling weapons with chemical agent since the Gulf
War.
•
The chances
of detecting any production of biological warfare agent,
or
small scale
production of chemical agent, with or without UN
inspections,
would be
slim. But we would
expect to detect evidence of the production of
large
quantities of chemical agent, with or without UN
inspectors.”
27.
The Assessment
stated that Iraq’s doctrine for offensive chemical and
biological
warfare
remained “unclear”. It had used chemical weapons for internal
repression and
against
Iran in the 1980s and the JIC judged that it “would be prepared to
use such
weapons
again in similar circumstances, and, in extremis, in defence of the
regime”.
The JIC
warned that since the departure of UNSCOM in December 1998, its
picture was
“limited”
and had been “further reduced”. Iraqi officials were “well
practised in concealing
such
programmes”. Increased procurement of dual use equipment and
materials could
not be
linked to chemical and biological warfare programmes. There were
indications of
continuing
progress. The JIC did not know if those were “accelerating”; but
the departure
of the
inspectors had removed “a constraint”.
28.
In relation to
Iraq’s chemical warfare activity, the Assessment
stated:
•
Iraq “could
have hidden dual use precursor chemicals and
production
equipment”
and the JIC continued “to assess that even with UNMOVIC
and
other UN
controls, Iraq could produce mustard agent within weeks of a
decision
to do so.
Iraq could produce limited quantities of nerve agent within months
of
such a
decision.”
•
Procurement
activities “which could
be associated with a chemical weapons
programme” had
“continued”,
including efforts to procure dual use chemicals,
and
attempts to procure crop spraying aircraft and protective
suits.
9
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2000, ‘Iraq: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Programmes’.
13