The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
616.
The Memorandum
included an assessment of the likely reaction in the first
72
hours after
a Coalition attack. The DIS stated that, while judging the overall
attitudes
of the
populace to the regime was “fraught with difficulty”, “there seems
little doubt that
the vast
majority of Basra’s inhabitants are opposed to the regime and would
welcome
its
removal”.
617.
Reflecting on
the lessons of the 1991 uprising and that, in 2003,
the
“circumstances
might be very different”, the DIS identified “several
noteworthy
characteristics”:
•
“Total
collapse of the Security forces and civil
administration: Though
there
was some
fierce fighting … security forces within the city … quickly
collapsed
… Within
days (even hours) Basra became an administrative and
governmental
vacuum.”
•
“Lack
of political or popular leadership: … With no
real religious leadership
within
Basra City and with the majority of rural tribal leaders unwilling
to lend
support to
the urban uprising there was … no one to curb the worst
excesses
of the
populace.”
•
“Popular
targeting of regime installations: …
typically ransacked and burnt
to the
ground.”
•
“Reprisals
against regime associated personnel: … Much
anecdotal
reporting
and academic accounts identify Basra (along with Karbala) as
the
site of the
worst excesses of the uprising, with summary executions
and
indiscriminate
massacres of security personnel.”
•
“General
collapse of law and order: … the
insurrection in Basra soon
descended
into general anarchy, with looting a major feature …
[W]anton
destruction
of public buildings and even the pillaging of museums
occurred
in
Basra.”
•
“Entry
of Iranian backed Iraqi groups: It seems
apparent that Iranian backed
Shia groups
(including forces linked to the Supreme Council for the
Islamic
Revolution
in Iraq, SCIRI) entered the environs of Basra on the second or
third
day of the
uprising … they also pursued an Islamic revolutionary agenda
–
destroying
examples of ‘unislamic’ practice …”
618.
Addressing the
likely reaction of the civil populace in 2003, the DIS stated that
it
had “no
definitive intelligence” but there were “a number of scenarios that
might occur”,
possibly
simultaneously in the city. Those included:
•
“Spontaneous
civil uprising: … either
before or during Coalition engagement
with Iraqi
forces in Basra governorate is unlikely … [R]ecollections of 1991
…
are likely
to lead to an extremely cautious reaction …”
•
“Reprisals: …
only high ranking regime personnel and those associated
with
particularly
repressive behaviour would be targeted …”
484