The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

958. Mr de Villepin telephoned Mr Straw on 19 March with a message for Mr Blair from

President Chirac.337 The President had been “shocked and hurt” by Mr Blair’s statements

to Parliament. They had been unnecessary. President Chirac understood the pressures

that the UK Government was under, but such statements were not acceptable from an

ally and an EU partner. Nor were they in accordance with reality.

959. Mr Straw rebutted the comments. He and Mr Blair had felt their comments were

justified by the circumstances; not to solve domestic problems but to explain the reality

of the situation to which France had contributed. The UK felt that, after resolution 1441,

“France had made a strategic choice not to follow through”.

960. Mr de Villepin responded that what he had heard from London and Washington

did not “link with the truth”. He concluded that the statements from the UK Government

had shown no courage.

961. Mr Straw concluded that “he knew a great deal about courage: the Prime Minister

had shown great courage”.

962. The first Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq (also known as the “War Cabinet”) took place at

8.30am on 19 March.

963. Mr Straw informed the meeting that he had received “an official complaint” from

Mr de Villepin “about the British representation of the French position in respect of Iraq”.

He also set out the need to explain the UK’s position to other countries and to publicise

the international support for the Coalition.338

964. The discussion on the importance of a UN resolution covering the post-conflict

phase is addressed in Section 6.5.

965. Advice on military issues is addressed in Section 8.

966. Subsequently, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce briefed Mr Blair on the military

preparations.339

967. A JIC Note issued on 19 March, ‘Saddam: the Beginning of the End’, stated

that intelligence showed the Iraqi regime was making final preparations for war.340

Saddam Hussein had rejected US demands for his exile and the US had:

“… now made clear that even a last-minute change of mind by Saddam would not

stop the Coalition from moving against Iraq’s WMD.”

337 Telegram [unnumbered] FCO London to Paris, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation

with French Foreign Minister, 19 March’.

338 Minutes, 19 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

339 Manuscript comment Manning on Letter Watkins to Manning, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military operations’.

340 Note JIC, 19 March 2003, ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’.

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