The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1037.
In a meeting
of DOP(I) on 15 February, Mr Blair made clear that the UK
should be
able
clearly to demonstrate that the conditions for transition had been
met, and that this
was as a
result of the increasing capacity of the ISF.955
The UK
should not be handing
over for
solely political reasons.
1038.
During a video
conference between Mr Blair and President Bush on 22
February,
Lt
Gen Houghton assessed that there had been good progress with
the ISF in the
South which
should allow security transfer in Maysan and Muthanna provinces by
late
spring.956
He assessed
that Basra was “less promising, given the collusion
between
police and
militia, aided by local politicians” and that arrests of police
“rapidly became
confrontations
over political and sovereignty issues”.
1039.
On 9 March,
Dr Reid wrote to Mr Blair explaining that, as a result of
the latest
Force Level
Review, troop levels would be reduced in May 2006, from
approximately
8,000 to
around 7,200 (see Section 9.4).957
That
reduction was made possible because
of the
“completion of various Security Sector Reform tasks, a reduction in
the support
levels for
those tasks, and recent efficiency measures in
theatre”.
1040.
In his
statement to the House of Commons on 13 March, Dr Reid stated
that the
completed
tasks included training of trainers and Iraqi troops being capable
of guarding
their own
establishments.958
1041.
On 15 March, a
JIC Assessment stated:
“The Iraqi
security forces [in Southern Iraq] can cope with the low level of
threat
posed by
the Sunni Arab nationalist insurgents and jihadists. Their
readiness to deal
with the
activities of Shia extremists or intra‑Shia violence is more
uncertain. Army
command,
control and logistics capabilities are all still developing, making
major
operations
without MNF support difficult. The police are a greater concern:
they have
multiple
loyalties and have taken sides in intra‑Shia clashes. A minority of
police,
particularly
in Basra, is involved in attacks on the MNF, the assassination of
Sunnis
1042.
On 20 April,
Mr Robin Lamb, Consul General in Basra, provided an
assessment
of the
security situation in Basra and its impact on the ability for UK
civilian staff to
operate
effectively (see Section 15.1).960
He
stated:
“Our LE
[locally employed] staff regard the Iraqi Police Service as at best
ineffective,
and at
worst complicit in the assassinations. We would support that
assessment.”
955
Minutes, 15
February 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
956
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 22 February 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush,
22 February: Iraq’.
957
Letter Reid
to Blair, 9 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Level Review and
Announcement’.
958
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13 March
2006, columns 1152‑1153.
959
JIC
Assessment, 15 March 2006, ‘Iraq: the Security Situation in the
South’.
960
Letter Lamb
to Mcgurgan, 20 April 2006, ‘Basra: Security and
Drawdown’.
292