3.2 | Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002

3.2 | Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford

311. Mr Drummond added:

“The US position is critical. There is plenty of press speculation and third hand

reporting from embassies about US intentions. Probably they do not yet have a plan,

and could be reluctant to share with us because they believe we are firmly set on

containment. The Cheney visit … next month may be important in gauging opinion.

Iraq will no doubt be on the agenda for the visit to Crawford. We are planning a

Whitehall meeting in early March. Before then, how should we be trying to get a

better handle on US intentions?”

312. In his letter to Mr Webb on 27 February, Mr Ehrman concluded that the issues

would “…need interdepartmental consultation soon. We should consider prompting the

Cabinet Office to initiate the process.”106

313. In his minute to Mr Hoon of 27 February, Mr Webb asked for permission to

participate in the process.107

314. A minute to Mr McKane forwarding a draft of the paper on 6 March stated:

“The paper has been produced in close consultation with FCO, MOD, SIS and the

Assessments Staff.”108

315. Mr McKane sent a folder of papers “commissioned by the Prime Minister”

to Sir David Manning on 6 March, including a draft of the ‘Iraq: Options Paper’.109

Mr McKane stated that the papers would be discussed in a meeting in Sir David’s office

the following day; and that Sir David would “want to consider and discuss [the paper]

with colleagues before deciding how to take it to the next stage”.

316. Copies of Mr McKane’s minute and the draft paper were sent to Sir Richard

Dearlove, Mr Ricketts, Mr Geoff Mulgan, Head of Policy in the Prime Minister’s Office,

Mr Scarlett, Mr Julian Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, Mr Drummond and to

Sir Richard Wilson’s Private Office.

317. The Government has been unable to find any record of Sir David Manning’s

meeting on 7 March, at which the draft ‘Options Paper’ was discussed.110

318. A minute to Mr Hoon described the ‘Options Paper’ as “intended to be background

reading … (rather than fully worked up policy positions)”; and informed him that the

“current text” had not been agreed by the MOD.111

106 Letter Ehrman to Webb, 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of Evil’.

107 Minute Webb to PS/Hoon, 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of Evil’.

108 Minute Dodd to McKane, 6 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.

109 Minute McKane to Manning, 6 March 2002, ‘Papers for the Prime Minister’.

110 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry, 22 July 2015, [untitled].

111 Minute Cholerton to APS/SofS [MOD], 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq: OD Secretariat Options Paper’.

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