8 | The
invasion
173.
Mr Blair
concluded that militia resistance in population centres did not
appear
significant
when set against the broad thrust of the campaign and the
Coalition’s
achievements
to date. The campaign was only 72 hours old and there was no case
for
adjusting
the presentational posture before it was known what pattern was
developing
on the
ground.
174.
By 24 March,
UK forces controlled Basra Airport.118
175.
In preparation
for a statement to Parliament by Mr Blair on 24 March,
Mr Blair’s
Assistant
Private Secretary provided a “note on military developments” which
said:
“Pockets of
resistance remain in the cities, particularly from hard-core
regime
supporters
… [The] city of Basra is surrounded, with airport in Coalition
hands
(but significant
resistance from hard-core regime supporters expected
…).” 119
176.
In his
statement, Mr Blair re-stated the UK’s “central objectives” as
“to remove
Saddam
Hussein from power” and ensure that Iraq was
disarmed.120
The
military
campaign to
achieve those objectives was being conducted deliberately in a
way
that “minimises
the suffering of ordinary Iraqi people” and “to safeguard the
wealth
of the country
for the future prosperity of the people”. That was why the
Coalition
had not mounted
a heavy bombing campaign before the land campaign, and
why
the immediate
actions of the land forces had been to secure oil installations,
which
had been
mined. Had the Coalition not “struck quickly, Iraq’s future wealth
would even
now be
burning away”.
177.
Mr Blair
said that the targets of the air campaign were the “infrastructure,
command
and control
of Saddam’s regime, not of the civilian population”. Water and
electricity
supplies
were “being spared” and there were “massive efforts to clear the
lines of supply
for
humanitarian aid”, although that was hindered by the presence of
mines.
178.
In relation to
the city of Basra, Mr Blair stated that the aim was to render
it
“ineffective
as a basis [sic] for military operations”. The city was “surrounded
and cannot
be used as
an Iraqi base”, but there were “pockets of Saddam’s most fiercely
loyal
security
services” in Basra who were “holding out”. They were “contained but
still able to
inflict
casualties … so we are proceeding with caution”. Basra Airport was
“secure”.
179.
Mr Blair
also said that:
•
The
Coalition objective in the desert in the West was “to prevent
Saddam from
using it as
a base for hostile external aggression”.
•
In the
North, the objective was to “protect people in the Kurdish
Autonomous
Zone, to
secure the northern oilfields and to ensure that the North
cannot
provide a
base for Saddam’s resistance”.
118
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
119
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Developments’.
120
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24 March
2003, columns 21-22.
31