The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
109.
Since the US
draft did not meet UK requirements, Mr Chilcott proposed the
talks
should
focus on principles, which could then be turned into text at a
later stage.
110.
Issues for
discussion at the talks were:
•
arrangements
for the immediate post-conflict period, including providing
advisers
to
Ministries rather than giving Iraqi exiles or Coalition officials
an executive role;
•
establishing
the IIA, facilitated by a UN Special Co-ordinator rather than the
US;
•
economic
issues, including the control of oil revenues by the UN or the IIA,
but
not the
Coalition; and
•
the
tactical approach to a further resolution, recognising that a large
resolution
covering
all aspects of activity in Iraq was less likely to succeed than a
series of
smaller
ones.
111.
Mr Chilcott
proposed that Mr Blair and President Bush should discuss a strategy
for
building
international support which took into account that it was not
realistic to expect
“the UN
Security Council to endorse an American designed plan for
Iraq”.52
112.
Mr Brenton
reported to the FCO in London on both 3 and 4 April.
113.
In his first
telegram, he reported conversations with US officials at the
Departments
of State
and Defense and in the NSC.53
114.
The Department
of Defense had made clear that the UN could not have a role
in
selecting
candidates for the IIA. US interlocutors had said that there was
likely to be an
Iraqi
conference, possibly in Southern Iraq in the following week, which
would set out
ideas for
establishing the IIA. Mr Brenton had emphasised the need for the UK
to be
consulted
on setting up the IIA and on the conference.
115.
Mr Brenton’s
telegram the following day sought to clarify US positions on
Phase
IV.54
He
emphasised that the NSC was close to the UK position on most of the
Phase IV
agenda.
There was considerable common ground between the US and the UK,
including
on the need
for a “significant UN role” and that oil revenues should be “in the
hands of”
Iraqis and
spent by the Coalition only for tasks authorised by a UN
resolution.
116.
On 4 April, Mr
Nicholas Cannon, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary, wrote to Mr
Simon
McDonald,
Principal Private Secretary to Mr Straw, describing the talks
between US and
52
Letter
Chilcott to Rycroft, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Meeting with US
Officials’.
53
Telegram
438 Washington to FCO London, 3 April 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Phase
IV’.
54
Telegram
448 Washington to FCO London, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Post
Conflict’.
55
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 4 April
2003, ‘Iraq, Post-Conflict Administration: US/UK
Talks,
4 March [sic]’.
150