9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

667. The junior official repeated the risks set out in his 19 November submission,

concluding that “It is impossible to predict before the event how these risks will play in

detail” and that choosing the best timing for JAM1’s release would mitigate them to some

extent. On timing, the official explained that the final detainee releases were expected

in early to mid-January, and “depending on developments on the ground, it might be

tactically wise to release [JAM1] somewhat earlier, although we would not expect to do

so before Basra has achieved Provincial Iraqi Control.”

668. The following day, the junior FCO official sent Mr Miliband’s office some additional

text supplied by Mr Prentice “as further clarification” of his submission. It said:

“Whilst delegating the decision to us is fine, this is not just a sovereign issue.

As GOC MND(SE) comes under MNF-I and Petraeus’ command, they would have

to be consulted. And we would have to inform the GoI (Maliki) of our plans as such

a decision would play into the broader Shia reconciliation strategy.”307

669. Mr Day’s parallel submission to Mr Browne explained that the FCO was taking

responsibility for JAM1’s release. The submission reflected advice from theatre that

delegated authority was needed because of the speed with which the position on the

ground was developing.308

670. The Private Secretary to Mr Bob Ainsworth, Minister for the Armed Forces, to

whom the submission was copied, wrote on the advice on 11 December that although

Mr Browne had already “noted the submission” she had concerns about whether the

decision should be delegated because:

“The implications of his release are strategic and I think the decision ought to be

taken here, away from tactical considerations.”309

671. Mr Ainsworth replied in relation to the submission: “I think this is wrong and should

not be delegated.”310

672. On 9 December, Mr Brown visited Basra, primarily for the purpose of “a Christmas

visit to the troops”.311

673. In a briefing for the visit, a Cabinet Office official told Mr Brown that the UK had

reached agreement with the US and Iraqi Governments on the text of the draft resolution

and supporting exchange of letters. The resolution would be tabled at the UN in New

307 Email FCO Iraq Group [junior official] to various, 8 December 2007, ‘Submission:

[NAME OF OPERATION].

308 Minute Day to APS/SofS [MOD], 7 December 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]’.

309 Manuscript comment Pusey on Minute Day to APS/SofS [MOD], 7 December 2007,

‘[NAME OF OPERATION]’.

310 Manuscript comment Ainsworth on Minute Day to APS/SofS [MOD], 7 December 2007,

‘[NAME OF OPERATION]’.

311 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Brown, [undated], ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Basra:

9 December 2007’.

305