The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
official.101
That note
said that Maj Gen Binns was still expecting to be able to
hand
over responsibility
for Basra Palace on 29 August, having written to Gen
Petraeus
with his
assessment of the PPF’s readiness. Equipment and fuel remained the
key
risks to handover.
232.
On 20 August,
at the request of the FCO, a Current Intelligence Group
(CIG)
examined
the influence of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party on the insurgency and Iraqi
politics.102
233.
The CIG’s Key
Judgements included:
“I. The
influence of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party on the Sunni Arab insurgency is
marginal.
The party
is fractured with little political relevance or popular support in
Iraq; this is
highly
unlikely to change.
“II. Iraqi
Shia politicans’ fears of a Ba’athist resurgence, however
exaggerated, are
genuinely
held. They will limit the Shia appetite for reconciliation with the
Sunni more
broadly.”
234.
The CIG judged
that many former leaders of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party had been
killed
or captured
in 2003; others had fled to neighbouring countries:
“Outlawed
by the Coalition Provisional Authority, much of the Ba’ath Party’s
senior
Sunni cadre
(most of the rank and file were Shia) went underground, while
the
party’s
system of patronage collapsed.”
235.
In Syria, two
former senior Ba’athists (Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad and
Izzat Ibrahim
al-Duri) had established the New Regional Command, loyal
to
Saddam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein’s execution in December 2006 had
exacerbated
rivalry
between al-Ahmad and al-Duri, leading to the emergence of two
factions
competing
for primacy. Those in both factions wanted to see the full
restoration of the
party – and
themselves – to power in Iraq.
236.
The CIG judged
that few Ba’athists still identified with their original Arab
socialist
roots.
Although most Ba’athists were fundamentally secular and
ideologically opposed to
AQ-I, they
were willing to co-operate with Sunni Islamists to attack the
coalition and what
they saw as
a Shia-dominated Iranian-backed Iraqi government.
237.
Although much
of the insurgency involved former regime officials and members
of
the
security forces, the CIG judged that most had abandoned
Ba’athism.
238.
Politically,
the CIG judged that the Ba’ath Party was “a spent force” which
had
little
political relevance or popular support in Iraq beyond pockets in
former regime
strongholds
such as Tikrit: that was “highly unlikely to change”. Nevertheless,
many Iraqi
101
Manuscript
comment [unattributed] on Minute Cabinet Office [junior official]
to Prime Minister,
20 August 2007,
‘Iraq – Transition in Basra’.
102
CIG
Assessment, 20 August 2007, ‘Iraq: How Important is the Ba’ath
Party?’
226