The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
375.
A briefing
note prepared by Lt Gen Pigott for Adm Boyce focused
on:
•
the
question of whether there was a winning concept;
•
the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of operations between
October
2002 and
March 2003 or one year later;
•
the
possible UK contribution; and
376.
Lt Gen Pigott
advised that the UK assessments of the plan were based on
“scant
information”,
and that the key areas of concerns on the US plan
included:
•
a mismatch
in the end states of the US and UK;
•
the lack of
a strategic framework;
•
potentially
optimistic assumptions about assessments of Iraqi
weaknesses;
•
insufficient
knowledge of the WMD threat in many important respects;
and
•
a question
about “to what extent” kinetic means could deliver strategic
ends.
377.
Lt Gen Pigott’s
view was that the UK should encourage thinking to move
towards
action in
2003‑2004 rather than in 2002‑2003, which “had a better chance of
success”
given the
challenges “including political red cards”. That was: “Not a recipe
for delay,
indeed
quite the reverse.” It would be difficult for the UK to send land
forces to
participate
in a “running start” but the UK thinking was “taking us towards a
‘distinctive’
(Package 3)
role”. For any significant contribution, force preparation would
need to
start “now”.
378.
The advice
from Lt Gen Pigott and the SPG was discussed in a
restricted Chiefs
of Staff
meeting on 17 July.174
379.
At the
meeting, Adm Boyce emphasised the privileged nature of the UK
access to
US planning
and the need for operational security. The points made in the
discussion
included:
•
One key
judgement which would affect planning would be whether an initial
push
would
trigger regime collapse.
•
Although
the use of UK bases was critical to the US plan there was, from the
UK
viewpoint,
no viable context within which it could participate in military
action:
“The legal
basis was particularly fraught with difficulty.”
•
A running
start “was not currently viable for the UK without significant
risk”.
•
A UK
contribution in the North that did not require integration into US
land
forces
would “fix” Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq, “open up a second
front, and
safeguard
the critical northern oilfields”.
173
Minute
DCDS(C) to DPSO/CDS, 17 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Summary of Key
Issues’.
174
Minutes, 17
July 2002, Chiefs of Staff (Restricted) meeting.
232