6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
812.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that the Royal Navy officer was part of the
Defence
Intelligence
Human Factors (DI-HF branch), which was part of
DTIO.287
813.
Professor
Stone wrote later in his book, The
Destruction of Cultural Heritage in
Iraq,
that he worked
with Professor Roger Matthews, Director of the British School
of
Archaeology
in Iraq, and Dr Neil Brodie, a specialist in the illicit trade of
antiquities, to
provide the
MOD with an itemisation of the locations and details of the most
important
historic
sites in Iraq.288
814.
Professor
Stone wrote that those sites were added to the British military
maps
for the
conflict and British Military Field Orders identified them as
places to be avoided.
Professor
Stone reported that the list was also drawn to the attention of
Lord Goldsmith,
who
provided advice on the legality of potential targets, and was also
shared with
Coalition
partners.
815.
Mr Hoon told
the House of Commons on 3 April 2003 that:
“The
Coalition is taking every precaution to avoid damage to the holy
sites in Najaf
and
Karbala. By contrast, we know that Saddam Hussein has plans to
damage
these sites
and blame the Coalition. Indeed his forces have used the site at
Najaf as
a defensive
position, firing on United States forces, who commendably did not
return
816.
On 12 April,
Mr Jacques Chirac, the French President, and Mr Bashar
al-Assad,
the Syrian
President, raised the looting of culturally significant sites,
including museums
and
archaeological remains, in conversations with Mr
Blair.290
That is
addressed in
Section 9.1.
817.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office sent a paper to No.10 on 14 April in response to
the
concerns
raised on 12 April about culturally significant
sites.291
It stated
that both the US
and the UK
had stressed their commitment to protecting sites such as mosques,
medical
facilities,
heritage sites and schools:
“The
Coalition consulted widely before the commencement of the military
campaign,
including
with the archaeological community. A comprehensive list was
established
that
included such Iraqi sites, and was designed to ensure that these
were avoided
as far as
possible during the bombing campaign. We are confident that
minimal
damage has
been done to Iraqi religious, cultural and archaeological sites a
result
of
Coalition activity.”
287
Minute
DI-HF to DJEP Public Inquiries Head, 17 September 2010, ‘Iraq
Inquiry: Protection of Cultural
Artefacts’.
288
Stone PG
& Farchakh Bajjaly J. The
Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq. The
Boydell Press, 2008.
289
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3 April
2003, column 1069.
290
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Chirac’;
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Bashar’.
291
Letter
Williams to No.10, 14 April 2003, ‘Protection of Significant Sites
in Iraq’ attaching Paper
‘Protection
of Significant Sites in Iraq’.
519