9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
“Iraq …
[is] also creating a new supply of battle‑hardened jihadists. The
relationship
and
capabilities being developed there will add resilience to the Al
Qaida campaign;
those who
survive will supply the next generation of leaders.”
180.
The transition
to PIC in Dhi Qar province took place on 21 September, in
a
ceremony
attended by Prime Minister Maliki as well as representatives of
both the Italian
and
Romanian governments, reflecting previous responsibilities in the
province.116
181.
Lt Gen Lamb
observed that Prime Minister Maliki’s comment that the
Government
will be the
official bearers of weapons, with no one else empowered to do so
legally,
made during
the ceremony, was an indication that he was prepared at least to
make
“encouraging
noises about the militias”.117
182.
On 21
September, Maj Gen Shireff reported that during a weekend
meeting:
“… Maliki
told Casey that the political situation in Basra needs to be dealt
with
quietly and
that the security situation in Basra was not bad enough to warrant
an
operation
that would upset the political balance.”118
183.
Op SALAMANCA
had been renamed Operation SINBAD and was subject to
“refinement”.
It remained “an operation that has a pulse of focussed security in
the form
of patrols
to protect engineers followed by a pause119
of ISF
activity, police training and
reconstruction”.
Detention operations would be avoided. The sequence of pulses
would
start in a
different area of the city.
184.
Maj Gen
Shirreff concluded his report:
“Op
SALAMANCA has forced a choice. If GoI [the Government of Iraq] no
longer
has the
will (or backbone) for the Basra Security Plan they signed up to in
June, one
option is
certainly to work within this political constraint. The SALAMANCA
planning
will not be
wasted. We can start many of the high impact projects through
Iraqi
contractors
and the PTTs [Police Training Teams] can conduct a degree of
cull/rehab
in police
stations … But be under no illusions: SALAMANCA ‘lite’ will not
deliver the
security
conditions for PIC. The full implication of GoI not wanting to rock
the boat,
deciding
that security in Basra is ‘good enough’ and trying to impose
constraints on
MNF freedom
of manoeuvre in the City will be de facto, unconditional PIC. This
will
leave Basra
in the hands of the militant militia and death squads, with the ISF
unable
to impose,
let along maintain, the rule of law. Unable to draw down completely
until
the US
effectively declare game over, we could find ourselves laagered up
in Basra
Air Station
and effectively fixed outside a city in hostile hands. In my view,
this does
not
constitute ‘good enough’, either in endstate or in reputation terms
for the UK
Armed
Forces.
116
Minute
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
117
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 24 September 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (228) 24 Sep
06’.
118
Minute
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
119
The Inquiry
believes this is a typing error and should read ‘pulse’ rather than
‘pause’.
37