12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
669.
The JIC
described the plan to address those issues:
“Prime
Minister Allawi wants more capable Iraqi forces to take on the
hard‑line
elements of
the insurgency and reduce his reliance on the MNF. More army
units
are coming
on line: elements of a mechanised brigade (including some tanks
and
armoured
personnel carriers) and two new army brigades are deploying this
month,
one to
Mosul and one to Baghdad. Three more police special commando
battalions
are
planned. But these units have limited operational capability (the
new brigade
in Mosul is
doing badly and is being replaced). This will restrict their
employability
in the
short term and may jeopardise longer‑term ISF aspirations. A plan
has been
put forward
to address some of the command and control problems: by the end
of
January
2005 a national command and control system will be in place linking
the
Prime
Minister, MOD and MOI to the national Joint Co‑ordination Centre
(JCC)
and
provincial JCCs. This will help, but better political leadership
and overall
management
by the MOI and MOD is required.”
670.
On prospects,
JIC stated:
“Through
2005 ISF capability will grow incrementally and significant units,
up to
brigade
size should be deployable by the summer. The ISF should benefit
from
the planned
improved training and equipment procurement programmes.
After
significant
delays these are now reported to be on track, however the
planned
expansion
of trained and equipped police from some 47,000 to 135,000 and
the
army from
some 3,000 to 27,000 between now and July 2005 seems very
ambitious.
The more
modest increases planned for specialist units may be more
achievable.
The NATO
mission to assist leadership training is stalled. The ISF will
remain
reliant on
support from the MNF in many areas, in particular heavy fire
support and
logistics.
There is little sign of the development of a coherent intelligence
capability,
which is
critical to success. Leadership and discipline will remain chronic
problems
affecting
capability; … Attacks and intimidation will also continue to
undermine
effectiveness.
Policing crime will have to remain a second priority in many
areas.
“According
to the MNF, 15 out of 18 provinces will be under local control –
requiring
only
limited support by the MNF – by the end of the year. But we judge
local control,
even in
some Shia and Kurdish areas, will remain fragile. We assessed in
October
that the
ISF would not be able to handle significant security
responsibilities unaided
until the
middle of 2005 at the earliest. We have also previously judged that
the
MNF are
constraining, not containing, the insurgency. We now judge that, if
the Iraqi
Government
and the MNF are unable to improve the security situation
significantly,
particularly
in and around Baghdad, a credible ISF capable of managing
the
insurgency
unaided will not emerge until 2006 at the earliest.”
671.
The JIC
advised that plans for Iraqi military forces had grown from three
infantry
divisions
to two infantry divisions, six ING divisions, an Iraqi Intervention
Force division
and a
mechanised brigade.
201