The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
289.
On 4 October,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Mr Straw’s Principal Private
Secretary
in response
to the FCO/MOD/DFID paper of 30 September on the implications of
the
Jameat
incident.138
Copies of
the letter were sent to Cabinet Office, MOD, DFID,
FCO,
Home Office
and Treasury officials as well as to C, to GCHQ and to diplomatic
posts
in Iraq,
the US, Brussels, and across the Middle East.
“The Prime
Minister agrees that we do not need to change our overall
strategy.
He is
convinced, however, that we need a major and sustained push over
the next
few months
on the political and security lines of operation if we are to get
what
we need –
the political process moving ahead on time and producing an
effective
and
moderate Iraqi Government after the elections, with visible
progress on the
Iraqiisation
of security.
“This will
require changes above all in the intensity of our work, in our (and
the
Americans’)
implementation of policy, and the structures for delivering them,
and will
need to be
underpinned by a more effective communications
strategy.”
291.
Sir Nigel went
on to set out Mr Blair’s views in relation to policy on the
political
process, on
security and on reconstruction.
292.
On the first,
Sir Nigel reported that Mr Blair did not believe that the UK
or US were
active
enough. In his view:
“Higher
Sunni turn out in December’s elections is the key to a successful
political
process,
leading to an increased willingness by Sunni politicians to take
part in a
representative
coalition government.”
293.
Mr Blair
considered that the situation required:
•
a more
vigorous and co-ordinated US and UK plan of activity focused on
contact
with Sunni
politicians;
•
continued
engagement with Iraqi leaders who could play a leading role
in
effective
government after the elections;
•
pressure on
Iraq’s neighbours to support the political process;
•
effective
lines of communication to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani
and
Muqtada al‑Sadr;
•
a
revitalised UN effort on political dialogue; and
•
a programme
of high-level UK engagement in South-East Iraq,
including
Ministerial
visits.
138
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 4 October 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
538