11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
a broad
range of Sunni support would include: “recognition, amnesty,
reversal of
de‑Ba’athification,
progress on sharing natural resources … investment,
employment,
political
representation, and release of detainees”.
287.
On 16 May, the
JIC assessed that “genuine fears of a Ba’athist resurgence”
were
helping to
keep the fragile Shia coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance,
together.227
There
had
been
“little substantive progress on de‑Ba’athification”.
288.
The JIC judged
that there had been “no tangible progress on national
reconciliation”
and that “antipathy” between Shia and Sunni communities
remained
“intense”.
289.
The JIC judged
that:
“… progress
on national reconciliation will remain slow unless there is a major
shift
in both
Shia and Sunni attitudes and expectations, backed by strong and
persistent
Coalition
pressure. At the moment it means different things to different
groups.”
290.
On 23 May,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary reported:
“… there
are now sensible amendments agreed by the Executive Committee to
the
existing
draft law, which should address some of the key problems for the
Sunni,
including a
sunset clause for the de‑Ba’athification Commission, a
representative
Political
Committee to supervise the process (overseen by the CoR [Council
of
Representatives]),
and introducing a judicial element to the process. Some
issues
remain, but
this represents welcome progress. Further pressure will have to
be
put on the
Shia in particular to agree an acceptable law, and on the Council
of
Representatives
to pass it.”228
291.
As described
in Section 9.5, Mr Blair stood down as Prime Minister on 27
June
2007.
Shortly after Mr Blair tendered his resignation, HM The Queen
asked Mr Gordon
Brown to
form a government.
292.
On 20 August,
a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) judged that:
“I. The
influence of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party on the Sunni Arab insurgency is
marginal.
The party
is fractured with little political relevance or popular support in
Iraq; this is
highly
unlikely to change.
“II. Iraqi
Shia politicians’ fears of a Ba’athist resurgence, however
exaggerated, are
genuinely
held. They will limit the Shia appetite for reconciliation with the
Sunni more
227
JIC
Assessment, 16 May 2007, ‘The Iraqi Government: One Year
On’.
228
Minute
Banner to Blair, 23 May 2007, ‘Iraq Meeting, 25 May’ attaching
Paper ‘Iraq – Reconciliation’.
229
CIG
Assessment, 20 August 2007, ‘Iraq: How Important is the Ba’ath
Party?’
55