The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
597.
The record of
the discussion on the UN negotiations stated that the meeting
had:
“…
concluded that the only way to keep the US on the UN route was for
there to be
a clear
understanding that if [Dr] Blix reported an Iraqi breach of the
first resolution,
then Saddam
would not have a second chance. In other words, if for some
reason
(such as a
French or Russian veto) there were no second resolution agreed in
those
circumstances,
we and the US would take action.”192
598.
The meeting
also agreed that, “at the time the first resolution was passed”,
the UK:
“would make
three public points:
(a) When
the Inspectors returned, Iraq’s obligation was not only to
co‑operate
with them
on access to sites etc, but also to provide accurate and
full
information
about WMD.
(b) If Iraq
breached this resolution, action would follow.
(c) In the
meantime we could not assume a peaceful solution to the problem
of
Iraq’s WMD,
so we would outline the military preparations we were
making.
(It was
important to do this only once the resolution was passed, and
not
before.)”
599.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting was sent to the FCO. It was also sent to
Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock, the MOD, the Cabinet Office and various diplomatic
posts.
600.
Mr Campbell
wrote that at the meeting, Mr Blair had felt that
Mr Straw was “too
close to
caving in on the two‑resolution route”.193
601.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that the meeting had:
“… agreed …
that there were clear objectives for the resolution, and
those
objectives
were … the ultimatum goes into 1441. If he [Saddam Hussein]
breaches
the
ultimatum action follows. So this was the instruction
given.”194
602.
In response
to Mr Hoon’s request to tell the US that it could plan on
the
assumption
the UK would make a land contribution, Mr Blair concluded
that, while
he wanted
to keep the option of Package 3 open, the UK must not commit
itself
at that
stage.
603.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October, seeking a decision that week
on whether
to tell the
US it could assume a UK land contribution in addition to the air,
maritime and
Special
Forces package already offered for planning
purposes.195
192
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UN Route’.
193
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
194
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 55‑56.
195
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
308