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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
597.  The record of the discussion on the UN negotiations stated that the meeting had:
“… concluded that the only way to keep the US on the UN route was for there to be
a clear understanding that if [Dr] Blix reported an Iraqi breach of the first resolution,
then Saddam would not have a second chance. In other words, if for some reason
(such as a French or Russian veto) there were no second resolution agreed in those
circumstances, we and the US would take action.”192
598.  The meeting also agreed that, “at the time the first resolution was passed”, the UK:
“would make three public points:
(a) When the Inspectors returned, Iraq’s obligation was not only to co‑operate
with them on access to sites etc, but also to provide accurate and full
information about WMD.
(b) If Iraq breached this resolution, action would follow.
(c) In the meantime we could not assume a peaceful solution to the problem of
Iraq’s WMD, so we would outline the military preparations we were making.
(It was important to do this only once the resolution was passed, and not
before.)”
599.  Mr Rycroft’s record of the meeting was sent to the FCO. It was also sent to Sir
Jeremy Greenstock, the MOD, the Cabinet Office and various diplomatic posts.
600.  Mr Campbell wrote that at the meeting, Mr Blair had felt that Mr Straw was “too
close to caving in on the two‑resolution route”.193
601.  Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the meeting had:
“… agreed … that there were clear objectives for the resolution, and those
objectives were … the ultimatum goes into 1441. If he [Saddam Hussein] breaches
the ultimatum action follows. So this was the instruction given.”194
602.  In response to Mr Hoon’s request to tell the US that it could plan on the
assumption the UK would make a land contribution, Mr Blair concluded that, while
he wanted to keep the option of Package 3 open, the UK must not commit itself
at that stage.
603.  Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October, seeking a decision that week on whether
to tell the US it could assume a UK land contribution in addition to the air, maritime and
Special Forces package already offered for planning purposes.195
192 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UN Route’.
193 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
194 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 55‑56.
195 Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’.
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