6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
of a UN
mandate it would be harder for the US-led Coalition to draw on the
support of
others in
the “aftermath”.
587.
The body of
the paper set out the immediate challenges and
responsibilities
the
Coalition would face on arrival, and suggested models for managing
the transfer
of power to
an Iraqi government. Immediate challenges included administering
Iraq,
providing
security and preparing to hand over power:
•
Administering
Iraq would involve: “Provision of basic necessities …
Restoration
of critical
infrastructure … Managing the economy … Medical treatment
…
Resettlement
of refugees … [and] Public information”.
•
A “strong
security presence” would be needed to “Ensure the
effective
destruction
of Iraq’s WMD programme … Provide internal and external
security
… Protect
any transitional administration … Manage Prisoners of War …
[and]
Initiate a
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
programme.”
•
Preparing
for the successful handover of power meant going into Iraq
“with
a clear
idea of how [to] get out again”. Iraqis should determine their
own
government,
but it should be “representative of Iraq’s diversity and …
deliver
effective
government”. Three options were identified:
{{democracy (a
government elected by a free vote and universal
suffrage);
{{representative
government (reflecting ethnic and regional interests);
or
{{a
unifying leader (although none was immediately
identifiable).
588.
The paper
stated that, although it would be:
“...
possible to explore ideas with Iraq exiles … they have little
credibility within Iraq.
Any
solution would almost certainly have to be sorted out once Saddam
had gone …
We should
avoid making promises (eg on the timing of any consultation process
and
possible
government structures) which may later prove
unworkable.”
589.
The section
describing possible models for the transfer of power focused on
the
nature of
the transitional authority to be established after the immediate
post-conflict
period:
“The
US-led Coalition would almost certainly have to retain
responsibility for
the
security function for some time after any conflict …
“In the
immediate aftermath of any war, the Coalition military forces would
need to
take
control and administer Iraq at a basic level, including eg ensuring
food and
medical
supplies. It is not clear how long this would last. Ideally, it
would be a matter
of weeks.
But much would depend on the security situation. It is quite
possible that it
could
become an extended period.”
590.
Once security
had stabilised, “the Coalition would look to establish a
clearer
structure
to carry out the full range of administrative functions … the ideal
would be to
make as
much use as possible of the existing Iraqi administrative
apparatus”.
213