9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
“From our
side, it may be impossible to compromise sufficiently on the
nuclear
negotiations
in a way that creates for the Iranians an incentive not to obstruct
our
objectives
in Iraq. Preventing them acquiring a nuclear capability may be
viewed
as a higher
priority than securing a reasonably stable, democratic and united
Iraq.
If so, how
do we alter the dynamics inside Iraq in a way that limits Iran’s
ability to
manipulate
the circumstances to its advantage?”
157.
Mr Asquith
considered that achieving success would require a combination
of:
•
building
Prime Minister Maliki’s confidence and credibility by ensuring
the
success of
the Baghdad and Basra Security Plans and persuading
political
leaders to
lend him their support;
•
persuading
Prime Minister Maliki that the Shia militias were undermining
his
authority
and persuading him to take or support action against
them;
•
reintegrating
Iraq into its Arab political and cultural context via the
International
Compact
(see Section 10.2); and
•
persuading
political parties to amend the electoral law to permit only
registered
parties and
individuals to stand for election, leaving the formation of
alliances
to post‑election
negotiations.
158.
Mr Asquith
concluded:
“Not a
single one of the above is entirely in our gift … On all these we
and our
military
colleagues continue to work on practical outcomes with the Iraqis.
Basra
being
smaller in scope may prove easier to manage … We can still succeed
over
the next
six months, but no one pretends it will be anything but a damn
close run
thing if we
do.”
159.
On 12
September, members of DOP(I) were asked to consider out of
committee
a paper
which proposed an “information strategy in support of UK policy in
Iraq”.107
160.
The paper had
been prepared by the newly‑created Iraq Information
Strategy
Group
(IISG), chaired by Mr Howard. It described UK objectives,
which included that all
UK and
overseas audiences should “understand that the UK mission is a
coherent cross
government
effort and not just a military operation” and “view us as a force
for good”.
In particular,
the UK public would be told that “a stable, democratic and free
Iraq is in the
UK’s and
world’s long term interests”.
161.
On 13
September, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs
told him that
Op SALAMANCA
would begin in the next few days.108
Its purpose
was “to achieve
transition
in Basra by establishing security”. The keys to success were
believed to
107
Paper MOD,
12 September 2006, ‘An Information Strategy for Iraq’.
108
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 13 September 2006, ‘VTC with
President Bush, 1445
13
September 2006’.
33