The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
15 and 16
June and only one attack (at BAS) at 2245 on Sunday 17 June
(which
caused
casualties). Attacks against the military re‑supply convoy from the
airbase
into Basra
were also markedly down. There have been attacks on BAS or the
Palace
every day
since 18 June.”
926.
The senior
official explained that on 18 June, his colleagues had discussed
the
cease‑fire
with JAM1. The discussion had led to an “outline plan to build
confidence on
both sides”
which involved:
a.
The release
of two further named detainees, both of whom were
classified
‘orange’ in
MND(SE)’s system (‘of some risk to the coalition if
released’).
The senior
official reported that “MND(SE) view the releases as
relatively
unproblematic”.
This would happen at the end of the trial cease‑fire, as a
test
of coalition
good faith.
b.
A
month-long JAM cease‑fire in Basra province, matched by a
continued
suspension
of strike operations by the coalition, which would retain the right
to
fire in
self‑defence, to interdict arms shipments and to intervene when
asked
to do
so by the Iraqi Government.
c.
Consideration of the release of two further named detainees,
depending on
the
effectiveness of the month long cease‑fire. These individuals were
more
significant,
and classed as ‘red’.
d.
The
possibility of an indefinite cease‑fire if the month‑long version
proved
successful.
JAM1 would be likely to seek additional detainee
releases.
927.
If the advice
was approved, the senior official explained that Lt Gen Lamb
would
brief Gen
Petraeus and either Dr Rubaie or Prime Minister Maliki on the
proposal. The
Foreign and
Defence Secretaries would be consulted at every stage of the
negotiations.
Releasing
the nominated detainees, who were “held on the basis of
intelligence, under
the powers
of internment provided in the resolution, rather than on the basis
of an
evidential
criminal case” was a matter for MND(SE) and the MOD.
928.
The risks
identified in the submission included that the US might view
the
contacts
with JAM as undermining their security strategy, although it was
reported that
Lt Gen Lamb
did not think this likely. The senior official wrote:
“GOC
MND(SE) and HMCG Basra strongly support this initiative. HMA
Baghdad is
also in
favour, with the caveat that al‑Maliki will need careful handling.
SBMR‑I is
also
supportive but notes that the initiative will need to be integrated
with broader
coalition
efforts to engage JAM.”505
505
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to
McDonald, Richmond & Foreign
Secretary,
20 June 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]: Shia Engagement’ including
manuscript comments
Richmond
and McDonald.
174