The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1026.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft with “initial advice” on
the US
proposal on
29 April.601
The letter
reflected Mr Hoon’s view that:
“… any
significant increase in our military commitment in Iraq would need
to be
considered
in the context of the whole cross-Government effort … if we were
to
take on
Najaf and Qadisiyah we would need FCO and DFID to help ensure
that
acceptable
arrangements are in place on the CPA (and post-CPA)
side.”
1027.
In late April,
allegations of abuse by Coalition soldiers in Abu Ghraib
prison
become
public. Section 9.2 describes the effect of those and other
allegations of abuse.
1028.
Major General
Andrew Stewart, GOC MND(SE) at that time, was one of
several
witnesses
who told the Inquiry that the pictures of Abu Ghraib had had a
“significant
effect” on
MND(SE), where the public began turning against Coalition
Forces.602
1029.
Mr Drummond
and Mr Mark Lowcock, DFID Director General
Corporate
Performance
and Knowledge Sharing, visited Iraq from 27 to 30
April.603
They
reported
that, while
the security situation had deteriorated, there were encouraging
signs
of progress
on the economy. The foundations of a market economy had been
laid,
including
through the currency exchange, but the reforms were “only half
done”; fuel and
utility
price subsidies had not been reduced and the Public Distribution
System for food
had not
been reformed. They concluded that:
“… whether
Iraq will remain a single resource (oil) economy with the potential
for a
small elite
to recapture the revenue or broaden out into a modern market
economy
is still to
play for.”
1030.
Mr Drummond
and Mr Lowcock also reported that the DFID programme
was
focused on
building the capacity of the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the
South.
Most DFID
funding for reconstruction was flowing through the World Bank and
UN
Trust
Funds, “thereby encouraging both to engage fully in Iraq”.
Mr Drummond and
Mr Lowcock
commented that that seemed right.
1031.
Mr Richmond
reported by telegram on 30 April that security remained the
“key
threat” to
development and reconstruction:
“The PMO
remains optimistic about project implementation but others are
sceptical.
NGOs report
many international staff out of the country; USAID are still
below
full
strength, with few staff outside Baghdad, and the PMO reports at
least some
pull
out/pull back by key construction companies including Bechtel,
Siemens and
possibly GE
[General Electric].”604
601
Letter
Baker to Rycroft, 29 April 2004, ‘Iraq: UK Response to US
Approaches’.
602
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 72.
603
Minute
Drummond and Lowcock to Private Secretary [Benn], 30 April 2004,
‘Iraq Visit Report’.
604
Telegram
205 IraqRep to FCO London, 30 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction,
Development and
Essential
Services’.
178