The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
saying that
if France had not threatened to veto any resolution authorising
action, we
could
probably have got a second resolution and the problem was that we
had tried
so hard to
get a second resolution that people assumed, wrongly, that we
needed
825.
In his memoir,
Mr Prescott wrote that:
“Apart from
Clare and Robin, everyone understood and accepted what
was
happening.
Although we all had worries, we tended to go along with the feeling
that
we were
stuck with Bush. Tony couldn’t walk away. We were blaming the
French,
for backing
out of supporting an invasion, but we knew the Americans would go
in
whatever
happened, so the French didn’t really matter.
“Our
relationship with the US had always been fundamental. All British
prime
ministers
have to decide whether we’re with the US or not. And Tony had
decided
we were.
Most of us agreed with that, deep down. During the run-up to the
invasion,
we all had
our own reservations, and we were genuinely trying to delay an
actual
invasion,
and go the UN route, if not stop it altogether, for as long as
possible.
But once
it was inevitable we felt that was it.
“My
attitude was that Tony, having made up his mind, should be
supported. I took
one of the
Cabinet meetings on Iraq and got quite carried away, saying it was
vital
to stick
together. We should do the brave thing, not be
cowards.”290
826.
Lord Boateng,
Chief Secretary to the Treasury from 2002 to 2005, told the
Inquiry
that he had
been “governed by a desire” that he sensed was shared with
colleagues that
“military
action should be a last resort” and that it was not until Cabinet
on 17 March:
“… when it
was clear that all other options had been exhausted and where
we
had the
benefit of legal opinion … that I formed the firm view that it was
now
827.
In his
Statement to the House of Commons that evening, Mr Straw said
the
Government
had reluctantly concluded that France’s actions had put a
consensus
in the
Security Council on a further resolution “beyond
reach”.
828.
As a result
of Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the
UN’s
demands,
Cabinet had decided to ask the House of Commons to support
the
UK’s
participation in military action should that be necessary to
achieve the
289
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
290
Prescott
J. Docks to
Downing Street: My Story. Headline
Review, 2009.
291
Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, page 9.
544