9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
751.
Lt Gen Lamb
also reported that Operation Fardh al‑Qanoon continued to
make
progress
despite the 18 April attacks. He wrote:
“Regrettably
it is all too easy for AQ to generate ‘spectaculars’ and give
the
impression
that things are worse than they actually are, but the most recent
trend
data
suggests otherwise.”
752.
Maj Gen Shaw’s
24 April weekly report noted that an IED attack in Maysan on
the
day
following PIC “served as a sharp reminder that problems remain in
the Province and
that it is
not a benign environment for the soldiers serving
there”.413
He
continued:
“Whether
this has been a good or a bad week depends on your criteria, on
what
you are
looking to measure. Positively, our posture is where we would want
it to
be …
But the cost mounts: a week to go and this is already the most
costly month
of Op TELIC
since the invasion. We are at the limit of our ability to achieve
effect,
in
particular to do anything about the casualties we are taking … The
threat will not
go away;
indeed, our Theatre view is that there is no incentive for it to do
anything
but rise
for as long as we are here. This will necessitate continued and
probably
increasing
investment in response, for as long as our presence here is judged
to
be of
sufficient political benefit to justify the cost in coalition
lives.”
753.
Mr Blair
annotated the final phrase, “it is only military benefit that
counts”.414
754.
On 24 April,
Lt Gen Houghton told the Chiefs of Staff that April:
“… had been
a bad period for casualties and it was conceivable that the
coherence
between the
number and rate of tactical losses and the UK’s strategic ambition
in
Iraq might
therefore, in public and other eyes, be called into
question”.415
755.
On 25 April,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told the FCO that Mr Blair
had concluded
the IPU
paper on reconciliation did not “do justice in urgency or scale of
ambition to
the task in
hand”.416
He asked
Mr Browne and Mrs Beckett to use their
forthcoming
visits to
the Middle East to explore the scope to intensify efforts on
reconciliation. The
FCO and MOD
were to produce “a more ambitious reconciliation plan” by 8 May. In
the
meantime,
there should be a rapid deployment of civilian and military staff
to the Joint
Reconciliation
and Support Cell.
756.
On 25 April,
at the request of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, the JIC assessed
the
possible
impact of PIC on southern Iraq.417
413
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 24 April 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24
April 2007’.
414
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Shaw to CJO, 24 April 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE)
– Southern Iraq
Update – 24
April 2007’.
415
Minutes, 24
April 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
416
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq:
Reconciliation’.
417
JIC
Assessment, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Transition in the
South’.
141