The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1043.
The JIC
reported that Coalition Forces continued operations against
Muqtada
al-Sadr’s
forces in Karbala and Najaf throughout May, but had not yet gained
control of
Najaf.
Negotiations continued but were judged by the JIC to be “slow,
opaque and so far
fruitless”.
Growing local opposition was reported in Najaf.
1044.
On Fallujah,
the Assessment said:
“The
Fallujah Brigade is a local expedient. Unless integrated into the
Iraqi national
forces’
structure, it risks entrenching sectarian division in the forces
creating
problems
downstream for the new Iraqi government and the
Coalition.”
1045.
Maj Gen
Stewart requested additional troops to provide both force
protection and
a mobile
reserve in southern Iraq.586
1046.
On 25 May,
Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft setting
out the
rationale
for the request. He wrote:
“Irrespective
of the decisions we reach on the commitment of UK forces to
Southern
Iraq as a
whole … We should meet this request.”
1047.
Taken
alongside the planned withdrawal of another battalion, Maj Gen
Stewart’s
request
amounted to a net increase of around 550 UK troops. The request was
made
“against
the background of the recent difficulties … particularly around
al-Amara”.
1048.
The letter
reported Mr Hoon’s view that this request should be separate
from
consideration
of the broader US request to take responsibility for additional
provinces.
1049.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote a second letter to Mr Rycroft on 25
May,
explaining
the advice of the Chiefs of Staff on the US request for additional
UK troops.587
1050.
In view of the
pressure that the additional deployment would put on the
Armed
Forces, the
Chiefs recommended staging the reinforcement, deploying first the
HQ
ARRC and
ensuring that there was a brigade ready to deploy if required, but
holding it
back until
absolutely necessary.
1051.
The letter
also suggested that it could prove difficult to explain the
additional
deployment,
both to Parliament (which might doubt whether the numbers
involved
were
sufficient to achieve the strategic effort required) and to the
Armed Forces more
widely,
given “the starkly conflicting messages of an increase in
commitment, alongside
the
emergent view in the public domain of sizeable adjustments
downwards in our
force structures”.
586
Letter
Naworynsky to Rycroft, 25 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Reinforcement and
Re-roling of MND(SE) Units’.
587
Letter
Naworynsky to Rycroft, 25 May 2004, ‘Iraq: options for a UK
military contribution to the wider
South’.
378