9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
•
A “system
in which the main communities can informally share the key
senior
positions,
without sectarianism being formally entrenched”; the
Research
Analysts
recognised that it might be difficult to reach agreement on
this,
commenting
that the answer might be to retain the tripartite structures at
the
head of
government – Presidency Council, Prime Minister and Speaker –
which
implied the
division of roles between the three main communities but without
a
specific
sectarian quota.
•
Federalism
– this was expected to be a key red line for each of the
main
communities
and the source of most distrust; the UK had “a strong
interest
in avoiding
any arrangement which would entrench sectarian divisions, eg
a
single
large federation in the South”. The Kurds were expected to
champion
the
devolution of oil revenues and the ability to manage their own
economic
development.
Shia Arabs were increasingly calling for some sort of
economic
federalism
of the South and a greater share of Iraq’s oil
revenues.
•
Religion
and national identity – the UK wished to see language similar to
the
TAL, in
which Islam was recognised as one source of legislation rather
than
the only
source. It would also be essential for the drafters to find a way
of
expressing
both Iraq’s identity as an Arab nation and the Kurdish desire
for
greater
recognition.
•
Militias –
the question of whether the militias should be disbanded or
integrated
into the
Iraqi Security Forces would need to be resolved at some point,
though
it was
possible that this should happen separately from the development
of
the Constitution.
•
The
electoral system – although it was recognised that the Sunni Arabs,
in
particular,
were likely to wish for changes in the electoral system (for
example
to move to
a constituency-based arrangement). Any provision on this within
the
Constitution
should not be framed in such a way as to require its
implementation
before the
December elections, since that would mean delay.
64.
Mr Blair
met President Bush at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles on 7
July.27
Mr Blair
said that
the US and UK objective should be to divide the Sunni insurgents
from the
foreign
jihadists.
65.
In
Mr Blair’s view, a strong effort was needed to pull Iraqis
away from the
insurgency;
he had no concern about talking to those on the fringes of the
insurgency in
order to
achieve that.
66.
Mr Blair
suggested that it would be important to handle conversations about
the
issue of
withdrawing the MNF with great care. He remained convinced that a
“visible
forward
plan” was needed so that it was clear the MNF wanted to leave when
they
could, but
were staying because of the scale of the insurgency. The plan would
show
a
projection of the coalition’s drawdown as Iraqi forces built up. In
MND(SE) Mr Blair
27
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 8 July 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush, 7 July’.
499