6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
379.
The paper
listed seven immediate military priorities in the aftermath of
hostilities:
“a. provide
for the security of friendly forces;
b.
contribute to the creation of a secure environment so that normal
life can be
restored;
c. work in
support of humanitarian organisations to mitigate the
consequences
of hostilities
and, in the absence of such civilian humanitarian capacity,
provide
relief
where it is needed;
d. work
with UNMOVIC/IAEA to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction
and
their means
of delivery;
e.
facilitate remedial action where environmental damage has
occurred;
f. enable
the reconstruction and recommissioning of essential infrastructure
for
the
political and economic development of Iraq, and the immediate
benefit of
the Iraqi
people; and
g. lay
plans for the reform of Iraq’s security forces.”
380.
The paper
stated that:
•
Those tasks
would, “wherever possible”, be carried out in co-operation
with
the UN.
•
UK military
forces would withdraw as soon as possible.
•
The UK
hoped to see early establishment of a transitional civilian
administration.
•
The UK
would work with the international community to build the
widest
possible
international and regional support for reconstruction and the move
to
representative
government.
381.
The paper
concluded with the 7 January description of the desired end state
for
a post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq (see Section 6.4).
382.
On 12
February, the Chiefs of Staff noted that work on the UK objectives
paper had
been
concluded, but not finally endorsed. The paper would be “ready for
release at the
start of
any offensive campaign”.180
383.
Mr Hoon
discussed the objectives with Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington
on
180
Minutes, 12
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
181
Letter
Manning to Rice, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
375