The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
inspected
by the IAEA, “who accepted, that with some modifications … would
be
suitable
for use in centrifuges”; “But there was no definitive intelligence
that the
aluminium
was destined for a nuclear programme.”
•
The CIG
continued to judge that:
{{“[I]f
sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it would take at
least
five years
to produce a nuclear weapon. This timescale would shorten
if
fissile
material was acquired from abroad.”
{{Iraq
“was capable of producing an improvised
nuclear device,
but
it lacks
suitable fissile material. Iraq has in the past explored the
use
of radiological
dispersal devices, but the
design we have seen was
not a credible
weapon. There is no intelligence that Iraq is
interested
in such
devices.”
730.
The JIC
Assessment of 9 September 2002 did not address Iraq’s
nuclear
aspirations,
simply stating: “We do not believe Iraq possesses nuclear
weapons.”403
731.
The Executive
Summary of the dossier stated:
“As a
result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has
•
tried
covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be
used
in the production
of nuclear weapons;
•
sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa …
•
recalled
specialists to work on its nuclear programme …”
732.
The main text
of the dossier:
•
referred to
the JIC Assessment in May 2001 that Iraq had continued
its
nuclear
research and that there was intelligence that nuclear scientists
had
been
recalled; but it did not include the warning in that Assessment
about the
limitations
of the intelligence; and
•
stated that
the IAEA had “dismantled the physical infrastructure of the
Iraqi
nuclear
weapons programme … But Iraq retained, and retains, many of
its
experienced
nuclear scientists and technicians who are specialised in
the
production
of fissile material and weapons design. Intelligence indicates
that
Iraq also
retains the accompanying programme documentation and
data.”404
403
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons –
Possible Scenarios’.
404
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
pages
24-25.
256