The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1287. In his review of the land operation in Iraq, Brig Barry wrote that “there was no

effective single land sponsor for ISTAR”.671 He stated:

“There is overwhelming evidence of a comprehensive failure to generate an

adequate tactical intelligence capability to meet the requirements of tactical

commanders. What capability was fielded was almost always too little too late.

This appears to have resulted from significant weaknesses in almost every area

of intelligence direction, collection, analysis, dissemination …”

1288. Comparing the ISTAR assets across the coalition, Brig Barry wrote that senior

US officers were “astonished to find the UK so lacking” in that capability. The US

were able to field platforms capable of both persistent ISTAR and armed action which

improved the ability to engage fleeting targets and act as deterrent “top cover” for ground

troops. The UK never had sufficient assets to do the same.

1289. On the lack of UAVs, Lt Gen Shirreff told the Inquiry that he had been told that

“no more staff effort could possibly be put into deploying UAVs to South‑East Iraq”.672

He thought that that was not because of the intention to draw down forces, but because

the MOD “was incapable of generating the drive and energy to deliver them”.

1290. Maj Gen Shaw told the Inquiry that there was always a worry that UK forces

would find it difficult to respond if security in MND(SE) deteriorated.673 He said that the

problem was not so much the number of UK troops available but “it was more to do with

situational awareness and intelligence”.

1291. Maj Gen Shaw told the Inquiry that ISTAR was “the major issue” and that

“we never got as much as we wanted”. While the UOR system was a responsive one,

and new equipment arrived “at a remarkable rate”, Maj Gen Shaw said that UAVs were

“the big equipment shortage and problem”.

1292. Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of Defence Procurement from May 2003 to April 2007,

told the Inquiry that ISTAR was “a classic example” of where incremental procurement

was necessary.674 He stated that anybody who “tried to envisage a big bang project

which will deliver everything you need will get it wrong, because the time it takes to

develop will be such that during that period all of your assumptions would have been

tested and some will have changed”.

1293. Sir Peter said that he thought the MOD went about trying to understand the

requirement “quite well”, by putting “some really good people in place who concentrated

on it quite hard”. The testing point came where the MOD “was invited to cancel a major

project platform to pay for it”.

671 Report Land Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a Land Perspective’.

672 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 35‑36.

673 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 33‑35.

674 Public hearing, 26 July 2010, pages 62‑63.

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