4.4 | The
search for WMD
670.
Mr Powell
informed Mr Blair that the draft included “Good defence for
Iraq”.372
671.
Mr Blair
asked for the speech to be circulated to MPs.373
672.
Mr Dowse,
who had succeeded Mr Miller as Chief of the Assessments Staff
in
November
2003, passed “two major comments” to the US Embassy in
London:
•
The section
of the draft speech on good news stories of intelligence
work
against
Libya and AQ Khan374
appeared to
pre-empt plans for co-ordinated
speeches by
President Bush and Mr Blair which had been under discussion
for
some
time.
•
The UK was
uncomfortable with the draft’s presentation of the role played
by
intelligence
from allies in the US assessment. The implication was that it
had
been the
crucial factor: “Examples: ‘Now, did this information make a
difference
in my
thinking? You bet it did …’”375
673.
In his speech,
Mr Tenet explained that intelligence analysts’ differences on
several
important
aspects of Iraq’s WMD programmes were spelt out in the
NIE:
“They never
said there was an ‘imminent’ threat. Rather, they painted an
objective
assessment
for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his
efforts
to deceive
and build programs that might constantly surprise us and
threaten
our interests.”
674.
Mr Tenet
compared the ISG’s interim findings with the October 2002
NIE,
emphasising
that any comparison was provisional: the ISG’s work was “nowhere
near
85 percent
finished”. The ISG needed more time and more data.
675.
The references
to the impact of intelligence received from foreign partners,
on
which
Mr Dowse had commented, remained unchanged. Mr Tenet
stated:
“Several
sensitive reports crossed my desk from two sources characterized by
our
foreign
partners as ‘established and reliable’.
…
“Now, did
this information make a difference in my thinking? You bet it did.
As
this and
other information came across my desk, it solidified and reinforced
the
judgements
we had reached and my own view of the danger posed by
Saddam
Hussein and
I conveyed this view to our nation’s leaders.
372
Manuscript
comment Powell to PM, 4 February 2004, on Speech (draft),
Tenet, 3 February 2004,
‘Remarks
for the Director of Central Intelligence George J Tenet at
Georgetown University,
February 5,
2004’.
373
Manuscript
comment Blair on Speech (draft), Tenet, 3 February 2004,
‘Remarks for the Director of
Central
Intelligence George J Tenet at Georgetown University, February 5,
2004’.
374 Abdul
Qadeer Khan, known as AQ Khan, the Pakistani nuclear proliferator.
On 2 February 2004,
AQ Khan
admitted on Pakistani television that he had sold nuclear secrets
to other countries.
375
Minute
Dowse to Scarlett, 5 February 2004, ‘Iraqi WMD: Tenet
Speech’.
557