6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
community,
no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international
security,
abiding by
all its international obligations and providing effective and
representative
government
to its own people.”
647.
Mr Bowen
commented that some had argued that the aspirations for the future
of
Iraq should
be translated into the main objective. He had resisted “on the
grounds that
our purpose
has been plainly stated by the Prime Minister as disarmament and
because
the
effective implementation of that policy does not necessarily
deliver our wider
aspirations”.
The objectives would also need to “evolve with changing
circumstances”.
If military
action were authorised, the paper would need to be
revised.
648.
Mr Lee sent a
copy of the draft to Mr Hoon’s office, commenting that, while the
text
was
“helpful in acknowledging the need to make military plans and
preparations in case
military
action is required it does not, from our point of view, go far
enough in providing
direction
for current military activity and an information
strategy”.324
Mr Lee did
not
expect the
draft to move forward until there was a clear UN position. He added
that the
Cabinet
Office and No.10 accepted that the objectives would need to evolve.
They were
not for
publication at that stage.
649.
Draft military
campaign objectives, building on the policy objectives, were
prepared
in late
January 2003 and are addressed in Section 6.5.
650.
On 22 October,
Sir David Manning informed members of the Defence and
Overseas
Policy Committee (DOP) and the Home, Environment and
Transport
Secretaries
that Mr Blair had approved the strategic policy objectives, which
“should
help guide
work in departments for the current phase of
activity”.325
651.
A version of
the objectives was published as a Written Ministerial Statement
by
Mr Straw
on 7 January 2003.
652.
On 10 and 11
October, the House of Representatives and the Senate
authorised
US use of
force in Iraq.326
653.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported on 11 October that President Bush was
“intensely
suspicious
of the UN”, but had “bought the argument that it is worth trying to
maximise
international
support by giving the Security Council one last
chance”.327
That
argument
had “got
stronger as the administration started to focus … on ‘day after’
issues: it is one
thing to go
to war without … UN cover, quite another to rule Iraq indefinitely
without
UN
backing”.
324
Minute Lee
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic
Policy Objectives’.
325
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
326 Almanac of
Policy Issues, 15 October 2002, Congressional
Resolution Authorizing Force Against Iraq.
327
Telegram
1326 Washington to FCO London, 11 October 2002, ‘US/Iraq: Will the
President go to war’.
223