Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
the problem and the choice of whether or not it was time to consider the serious
consequences intended by 1441.
413.  Secretary Powell concluded that:
“The security of the region, the hopes for the people of Iraq, and our security rest
upon us meeting our responsibilities and, if it comes to it, invoking the serious
consequences called for in resolution 1441 …”
414.  Mr Igor Ivanov stated that Iraq should be set clear tasks to provide objective
criteria by which to assess progress and the threat posed by Iraq.
415.  The debate in the Council demonstrated that remedies other than the use
of force to achieve Iraq’s disarmament had not yet been exhausted.
416.  Mr Igor Ivanov stated that the Council should be guided by the professional
data provided by the inspectors to, “without making a mistake, come to the
correct conclusion”.
417.  Substantial progress had been made and could not be ignored. The Council should
urge Baghdad to increase co-operation and the work of the inspectors “must be made
more systematic and focused”. Iraq should be set clear tasks, including through the
submission of the UNMOVIC and IAEA work programme and the list of key disarmament
tasks required by resolution 1284 (1999). Adoption of such a programme would provide
“objective criteria” to assess both the degree of Baghdad’s co-operation and whether
Iraq was “a threat to international peace and security”.
418.  Russia’s position, “shared by the overwhelming majority of States in the world,
including within the Security Council”, was that inspections “must continue”. There was:
“… a unique opportunity to reach agreement on how to solve this … problem
through political means, in strict accordance with the UN Charter. This is a real
opportunity, and it must not be missed. Force may be resorted to, but only when all
other remedies have been exhausted. As may be seen from today’s discussion, we
have not yet reached that point …”
419.  Other members of the Security Council emphasised the need for Iraq
to co-operate actively and unconditionally to disarm; the need to exhaust
the inspections route; and the importance of Council unity.
420.  Mr Luiz Derbez, the Mexican Foreign Minister, stated that the Iraqi Government
continued to evade its international responsibilities and the Council was united about the
goal of disarmament. But the Council was “increasingly divided as [to] the most effective
and least costly manner by which it may be achieved”. Mexico’s view was that the
“Security Council’s primary task” was to ensure the inspectors fulfilled their mission.
254
Previous page | Contents | Next page