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4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
the replacing of the reference to an ability to produce an unreliable IND within
a few months, by a reference to Iraqi experimentation with radiological dispersal
devices (RDDs) during 1987, but the programme “never progressed beyond
the research stage and was dropped”. A box described such devices as an
“ineffective weapon”.
452.  The draft also contained a new “Conclusion” summarising the current position.
453.  Mr Scarlett asked that the “representatives” of JIC members attending a meeting
to be chaired by Mr Miller at 0900 the following morning, should “come armed with
suggested additions/ deletions/amendments to be decided at the meeting”.223 He also
asked for “final comments” by 1300 on 17 September.
454.  Mr Scarlett cautioned:
“In public presentation terms, this draft remains a highly sensitive document. I would
therefore be grateful if you each retain very tight control over its distribution …”
455.  Mr Scarlett held a meeting “to work up a strategy on Iraq” later that day.224
456.  A minute from Mr Kelly to Mr Campbell on 17 September suggests that this
discussion was essentially about plans for printing and publishing the document and
preparing supporting material.225
457.  Mr Miller told the Hutton Inquiry that the draft dossier was discussed in a meeting
he chaired on 17 September.226
458.  The Defence Intelligence Staff expressed concerns that some of the
statements in the draft on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons could not
be substantiated by the intelligence it had seen.
459.  A member of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) wrote to the Assessment Staff
early on 17 September reflecting concerns that some of the statements on chemical and
biological weapons in the draft could not be substantiated by the intelligence seen by the
DIS.227 The comments included:
Executive Summary, Para 3 – 1st Bullet: The judgement ‘has continued to
produce chemical and biological agents’ is too strong with respect to CW. ‘has
probably’ would be as far as I would go. And ‘continued to produce BW agents’.
This is quite strong considering what the int actually says. [Iraq has a biological
production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin
223  Minute Scarlett to JIC Members, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Papers for Public Presentation’.
224  Email Blackshaw to Kelly and Smith, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
225  Minute Kelly to Campbell, 17 September 2002, ‘Publication of the Dossier’.
226  The Hutton Inquiry, public hearing, 11 August 2003, page 155.
227  Minute ADI PS [DIS junior official] to JIC Assessments Staff, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD dossier –
Comments on Revised Draft (15 Sept 2002)’.
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