4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
the
replacing of the reference to an ability to produce an unreliable
IND within
a few
months, by a reference to Iraqi experimentation with radiological
dispersal
devices
(RDDs) during 1987, but the programme “never progressed
beyond
the
research stage and was dropped”. A box described such devices as
an
“ineffective
weapon”.
452.
The draft also
contained a new “Conclusion” summarising the current
position.
453.
Mr Scarlett
asked that the “representatives” of JIC members attending a
meeting
to be
chaired by Mr Miller at 0900 the following morning, should
“come armed with
suggested
additions/ deletions/amendments to be decided at the
meeting”.223
He
also
asked for
“final comments” by 1300 on 17 September.
454.
Mr Scarlett
cautioned:
“In public
presentation terms, this draft remains a highly sensitive document.
I would
therefore
be grateful if you each retain very tight control over its
distribution …”
455.
Mr Scarlett
held a meeting “to work up a strategy on Iraq” later that
day.224
456.
A minute from
Mr Kelly to Mr Campbell on 17 September suggests that
this
discussion
was essentially about plans for printing and publishing the
document and
preparing
supporting material.225
457.
Mr Miller
told the Hutton Inquiry that the draft dossier was discussed in a
meeting
he chaired
on 17 September.226
458.
The Defence
Intelligence Staff expressed concerns that some of the
statements
in the draft on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons could
not
be substantiated
by the intelligence it had seen.
459.
A member of
the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) wrote to the Assessment
Staff
early on 17
September reflecting concerns that some of the statements on
chemical and
biological
weapons in the draft could not be substantiated by the intelligence
seen by the
DIS.227
The
comments included:
•
“Executive
Summary, Para 3 – 1st Bullet: The
judgement ‘has continued to
produce
chemical and biological agents’ is too strong with respect to CW.
‘has
probably’
would be as far as I would go. And ‘continued to produce BW
agents’.
This is
quite strong considering what the int actually says. [Iraq has a
biological
production
capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin,
aflatoxin
223
Minute
Scarlett to JIC Members, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq WMD: Papers for
Public Presentation’.
224
Email
Blackshaw to Kelly and Smith, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
225
Minute
Kelly to Campbell, 17 September 2002, ‘Publication of the
Dossier’.
226
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 11 August 2003, page 155.
227
Minute ADI
PS [DIS junior official] to JIC Assessments Staff, 17 September
2002, ‘Iraqi WMD dossier –
Comments on
Revised Draft (15 Sept 2002)’.
199