The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The US-led
Coalition providing security, mandated by the UNSC but
not
answerable
to the UN.
•
The World
Bank and IMF overseeing economic reconstruction, both
the
policy
framework and the award of contracts above a certain
threshold,
under UN
authority.”
534.
The guidance
stated that the UK force would reduce from large scale
(three
brigades
plus) to medium scale (one brigade plus) “if possible by the
autumn”.
535.
The UK would
make no commitment on any “vertical” (functional) sector, but,
in
keeping
with Mr Straw’s instruction of 3 February, the paper stated
that the UK would
consider,
but not commit to, providing support for UN-led justice sector
reform “provided
we had the
right cover”.
536.
Mr Straw
commented that he was “very glad” to see how much the
paper
highlighted
the UN’s role and that he was “ready to weigh in at any time with
[Secretary]
537.
Mr Pollard
showed the IPU paper to Mr Hoon the same day.226
He explained
that
a more
detailed cross-government paper, setting out potential UK
involvement in Iraq in
the short,
medium and long term, would be prepared after the Rock
Drill.
538.
The first
paper matching that description was the ‘UK Vision for Phase IV’,
sent to
No.10 on 26
February and described later in this Section.
539.
The Rock Drill
on 21 and 22 February was the first time representatives of all
US
military
and civilian agencies involved in post-conflict administration had
met in one
540.
The UK team
was led by Mr Chilcott, accompanied by a military secondee to
the
IPU, a DFID
representative, Maj Gen Cross and (acting) Maj Gen
Whitley.228
541.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that:
“The
inter-agency rehearsal for Phase IV … exposes the enormous scale of
the task
…
Acknowledgment that this is beyond US capabilities. Private
realisation by some
that it
will require a UN umbrella, but planning does not take account of
this …
“Overall,
planning is at a very rudimentary stage, with the humanitarian
sector more
advanced
than reconstruction and civil administration.”229
225
Minute Owen
to Chilcott, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day-After (Phase
IV)’.
226
Minute
Pollard to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day After’.
227
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
228
Telegram
235 Washington to FCO London, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After:
Rehearsal of Office of
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance’.
229
Telegram
235 Washington to FCO London, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After:
Rehearsal of Office of
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance’.
404